



Save the Children



Independent Analysis and Evaluation of the El Niño Drought Response in Mozambique - Promoting recovery and building resilience of drought affected people in Mozambique (COSACA II)

FINAL REPORT

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Completed by:



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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
CBHA	Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies
CCM	Christian Council of Mozambique
CD	Country Director
CMU	Consortium Management Unit
COSACA	Concern Worldwide; Oxfam GB, Save the Children International; CARE International
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief Alliance
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for Liberation of Mozambique)
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HH	Households
ICAI	Independent Commission on Aid Impact
INAS	National Institute for Social Action
INGC	National Institute for Disaster Management
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MoH	Ministry of Health
MZN	Mozambican Meticals
NGO	Non-government organization
OFDA	U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PPA	Programme Partnership Arrangement
PoC	Point of Contact
RAM	Rapid Assessment for Market
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance Party)
SCI	Save the Children International
SDAE	District Services of Economic Activities
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SSJR	South Sudan Joint Response
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nation Environmental Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

The following report provides an independent review of COSACA II, a consortium comprising Concern, Oxfam, Save the Children, and CARE in Mozambique responsible for implementing a DFID, Sida, OFDA, and ECHO funded drought recovery for the period July 2016 – June 2017 (July 2016 – March 2017 for DFID). The project covers seven provinces: Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Zambezia, Manica, Tete and Maputo with the primary aim of ensuring that drought affected households have adequate access to food and water to meet their daily essential needs, as well as access to market integrated livelihood activities which support their children's well-being. COSACA was created in order to leverage the unique technical skills and geographical reach of each agency in order to more effectively coordinate humanitarian preparedness and response, and to improve members' capacity to respond within 72 hours of a disaster. Each of the Consortium agencies has a committed, long-term presence in Mozambique, and this brings expertise and experience working in various provinces across the country. Together, they are currently delivering programmes focused on Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL), Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), child protection, education, health and nutrition.

Our research team was contracted to conduct an evaluation to generate evidence to measure effectiveness of project interventions and Consortium coordination. The evaluation aimed to document project level success, to provide insight in to aspects that can be improved, and to provide learning to inform future consortium-based programming. To do this, we completed a qualitative assessment including focus group discussions and key informant interviews to assess project appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage, internal and external coordination, and value for money.

Our evaluation was limited in time and scope. This evaluation was effectively conducted in less than a month, an incredibly short timespan for an evaluation of this nature. The time constraints in completing this project restricted the team to visiting only critical pre-determined locations covered by the four partners. Further, it restricted choice of research methodology solely to qualitative work as quantitative data collection can take more time.

The evaluation was further limited by the fact that project activities were ongoing throughout the evaluation period. Further, Sida funded WASH and seed programming was extended through June 2017. Thus, program and specifically Value for Money analysis on economy, efficiency, and effectiveness was completed using a combination of program data submitted (covering the period of July 2016 – March 2017), qualitative findings, and input from the COSACA implementing partners. We did not have project completion data to show program achievement compared to target indicators

Due to time constraints, our evaluation focused predominantly on food security and seed and tool distribution; the WASH, nutrition, and child protection aspects of the program were discussed only as they came up naturally in discussion. We completed research in four locations, allowing for the greatest breadth of coverage possible in the time allocated while ensuring coverage of all major activities and implementing partners' programming: Gaza: Mabalane (Save the Children), Inhambane: Funhalouro (Oxfam - Funhalouro Tsenane and Tome and Care - Funhalouro Sede), and Zambezia: Mopeia (Concern). Evaluation questions included those concerning Relevance/Appropriateness (Is this program the right one for mitigating the problems at hand?), Effectiveness (Are the program objectives being achieved?), Efficiency (Are resources being used economically?), and Coverage/Impact (What is the effect of the intervention in proportion to the overall situation?).

Through our qualitative research we found that despite challenges, overall the intervention saved lives, positively impacted targeted communities, and provided good value for money. Seed and tool distribution was discussed as the activity most likely to have a positive impact over the long term. The e-voucher system was also reviewed favorably. Some involved in the research questioned the legitimacy of the selection for beneficiary lists, citing issues with government involvement (as either positive or negative), favoritism, and difficulties in verifying who were actually the most vulnerable community members. Food distribution fairs were garnered a somewhat mixed response due to the difficulties faced by those living in rural areas to physically travel to the fairs.

Coordination between partners was difficult and faced numerous obstacles but – most importantly - it worked. While the Consortium Management Unit (CMU) could be better managed, as it led to a disconnect between the management unit and operational staff at the local level and a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities, virtually all COSACA staff saw the value in maintaining the Consortium due to shared funding and the high profile as one of the biggest, if not the biggest, responders to emergencies in Mozambique.

Overall, success of the COSACA II intervention can be felt through project effectiveness, defined as the extent to which the COSACA II evaluation achieved its purpose, program efficiency in terms of the outputs achieved as a result of program input, and in coverage as displayed through the program's targeting of the most vulnerable populations. Vulnerable communities received aid; without the aid, they would have not only suffered, but likely died. Additionally, beneficiaries approved of the overall effort and of the specific activities conducted.

Despite some indicators being only partly achieved to date due to the ongoing activities of WASH and Seed programming in some areas, analysis of program budget documents showed good value for money in terms of project economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.. The Consortium structure allowed for cost savings through shared resources, which meant that more of the project budget went to beneficiaries instead of overhead and equipment costs. Further, though some aspects of the project were rolled out late and some money was lost as previously distributed seeds dried up and needed to be replaced, beneficiaries participating in several of the program activities were extremely satisfied with the results. All programs experience difficulties in determining the best ways for disparate entities to most effectively work together. Now that the structure has been created, it will be easier to avoid costly mistakes such as delays in activity rollout, which will improve future program efficiency.

Many of the challenges experienced in program implementation and internal and external coordination can be mitigated in the future by building upon lessons learned, described in detail in the recommendations section of this report. In short, problems with coordination can be prevented through harmonized timelines set by the various donors, a devoted staff to oversee activities of all implementing partners, and increased sensitization of government staff, including through the promotion of linkages between national and local government to reinforce criteria and mitigate the possibility of staff members inserting their own interests into the project.

1.0 Introduction: Emergency Response within the Mozambican Ecosystem

It is important to situate the evaluative context of the COSACA II programming activities within the wider ecosystem of humanitarian aid and emergency response in Mozambique. The Venn diagram (Figure 1) below captures the wider Mozambican ecosystem and relationships this evaluation examined.




Figure 1 – Evaluative Context of COSACA II

Note: while this diagram says it is DFID funded, it is actually funded jointly by DFID , EDHO, OFDA, and Sida

Section Two of this report provides important background information and gives more context for the lower two circles in the Venn diagram. This information highlights the complex dynamics at play when conducting emergency relief programming in such ecosystems. Section Two begins with providing an overview of Mozambique’s political history, geography and climate conditions, the impact of natural disasters, and a short discussion on emergency relief and humanitarian aid efforts in Mozambique and key stakeholders involved. The last sub-section highlights the history, background, and approach of the COSACA Consortium during past and current interventions.

The evaluation’s rationale and scope is addressed in Section Three. Section Four provides an overview of the methodological approach and methods employed, as well as a detailed discussion of the limitations. The evaluation team consisted of professional researchers and evaluators with decades of combined experience working across Africa. The entire team concurs that the unusually short time frame for this evaluation severely restricted the breadth and depth of this evaluation, and thus the final scope of this report. A detailed presentation of the limitations that arose during this evaluation are presented here and referenced throughout the report.

Section Five contains the comprehensive evaluative findings for COSACA II, and also compares them

to the findings from the baseline (actually a midline) assessment and an endline evaluation of COSACA I for similarities. Recommendations for COSACA II are presented in Section Six, and references various recommendations from our analysis of findings that triangulate with COSACA reports as well as highlighting a brief overview of the recommendations from previous external evaluations. A short conclusion summarizes the report in Section Seven.

2.0 Background

2.1 Country Context

After ten years of war, Mozambique gained independence from the Portuguese in 1975, only to plunge back into another 17 years of fighting after the South African and Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) governments created and backed an opposition group (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, or Renamo); peace finally came in 1992. Since then the formerly Marxist party Frelimo (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, the party that led the country to independence) has won all democratic elections, yet each election since 1992 has been marked with at least one if not all of the following: dissent, boycotts, appeals, contestation of results. In 2015, Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo's leader since the early 1980s) claimed that the October 2014 elections were rigged and threatened to take the six provinces he claimed Renamo won. In the past couple of years, the conflict between opposing parties has led to violence in several areas throughout the country, with thousands of refugees fleeing to Malawi and Zimbabwe. A ceasefire between Renamo and Frelimo has been in place since the end of 2016 to allow for peace talks.

The three decades of wars destroyed such a vast amount of Mozambique's physical infrastructure that the government has had to expend great effort to convince individuals (and donors) of state accountability and transparency. Ramifications from this denigration continue today as evidenced by a dearth of governmental services, particularly in less developed areas.

2.3 Geographical and Climate Overview

Aside from the challenges arising from colonialism, a protracted civil war, and underdevelopment, Mozambique also faces numerous geographical features and extreme weather conditions that exacerbate any natural or man-made disasters and hinder long-term sustainable development.

Geographically, Mozambique is the 16th largest country in Africa (801,590sq km/309,496sq mi) and is divided by the Zambezi River into two topographical regions. North of the river the coastal plains give way to low hills, plateaus, and eventually highlands in the northwest. To the south of the Zambezi River is a broader lowland area, drained by the Limpopo River, with the Lebombo Mountains further south, bordering Swaziland and South Africa (see Figure 2).¹ Approximately 60% of the population resides along the country's 2,740km of coastline and downstream of nine regional river basins, exposing residents to cyclones and floods.² Droughts are common and reoccurring, despite the prevalence of large amounts of rain.



Figure 2 – Mozambique Topography Map

2.3 Impact of Natural Disasters

Mozambique has two climatic seasons of six months each. A wet season typically lasts from October to March and a dry season from April to September. Climate change is disrupting these patterns, with frequent disruptions resulting in drought and/or flooding. Flooding alone (between 2000 and 2013) has

¹ <http://www.vidiani.com/detailed-topographical-map-of-mozambique/> (accessed 18 May 2017)

² World Bank. 2014. *Mozambique: Enhancing Spatial Data for Flood Risk Management Project*.

resulted in over 1,200 deaths, the displacement of an additional 1.5 million people and the destruction of physical infrastructure valued at USD1.5 billion.³

Cyclones are a common feature as well, and on 15 February 2017, tropical cyclone Dineo (Category 3) brought damaging winds directly to Inhambane province. Government sources reported 600,000 people affected, with seven deaths and 50 injuries. Over 50,000 homes were partially destroyed, over 1,600 school classrooms destroyed or collapsed, and 72 health clinics damaged. With wind speeds in excess of 100km/h, the cyclone also destroyed nearly 27,000 hectares of crops recently planted. While other notable cyclones have occurred in the past 17 years, droughts have also occurred.⁴ The World Bank estimates that “as much as 58% of the population is vulnerable to natural disasters and that annual economic growth is 1.1 percentage points lower than it otherwise would be, as a result of weather and water shocks.”⁵ An overview of natural disaster risks in Mozambique is found in Figure 3.




Figure 3 – Natural Disaster Risk Zones in Mozambique⁶

2.4 Emergency Relief and Humanitarian Aid Efforts in Mozambique

COSACA not only works within the constraints of Mozambique’s political, historical, and geographical attributes, but as a Consortium, it is embedded in complex institutional arrangements at both the local and international level. With coordination and collaboration as key components of the healthy functioning of any Consortium, understanding the complex institutional context in Mozambique is important. Numerous stakeholders related to emergency relief and humanitarian aid efforts in Mozambique are highlighted in this sub-section.

The Government of Mozambique maintains several institutions and response mechanisms for natural disasters. Some include: the Instituto Nacional de Gestao de Calamidades (INGC), Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition’s Assessment (SETSAN), Vulnerability Assessment Group (GAV), National Civil Protection Unit (UNAPROC), Humanitarian Country Team, and the Humanitarian

³ World Bank. 2014. *Mozambique: Enhancing Spatial Data for Flood Risk Management Project*.

⁴ Jennifer Fitchett and Stefan Grab. 2014. “A 66-year tropical cyclone record for south-east Africa: temporal trends in a global context.” *International Journal of Climatology*

⁵ World Bank. 2014. *Mozambique: Enhancing Spatial Data for Flood Risk Management Project*, p. 1

⁶ Mozambique: Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Country Note, DRFI Country Notes – Working Paper, June 2012.

Country Technical Team. Local NGOs are also growing in capacity to respond to these natural disasters, with several working in partnership with COSACA partners.⁷

Several UN agencies have decades of experience working in Mozambique. In 2007, Mozambique was one of eight countries chosen for piloting the UN's "Delivering as One" reform (signifying one programme, one budgetary framework and one fund, one leader, one office/common services, and one voice).⁸ There are numerous UN agencies working on the ground in Mozambique.⁹

Working in collaboration with these UN agencies and major donors are numerous international non-government organisations (INGOs). The four COSACA partners (Concern, Oxfam, Save the Children, and CARE) have a large presence, but other important INGOs include: ActionAid, World Vision, World Relief, Southern African Development Community, Samaritan's Purse, The Hunger Project, and Caritas Mocambicana, to name a few.¹⁰

With these various stakeholders coming from different perspectives (i.e. local vs. international, government vs. non-government) coordination, collaboration, and communication remain an ongoing challenge. While the government is growing in its capacity to respond to emergency situations, according to a local UN representative, government agencies can still be slow to respond with issuing emergency alerts or providing rapid needs assessments in a timely manner. Another issue raised by the representative is the debate between conditional or unconditional aid. The Mozambique government often presses for conditional aid, but aid agencies emphasize the dire situation and need for a rapid response that might override the government's long-term desire for sustainable development. Aid agencies such as COSACA and the WFP therefore advocate for immediate distribution of unconditional aid. This debate is couched in the relief to development continuum that also encompasses recovery and risk reduction, an important topic considering the prevalence of natural disasters in Mozambique and exacerbated by the country's low state of development. It is in within this institutional environment and relief to development continuum that we can better understand the emergency responses to these different disasters.

In 2015 and 2016 Mozambique faced severe drought in the Southern and Central regions as a result of El Niño prevailing conditions. At least 1.5 million people were affected across several provinces (Zambezia, Manica, Sofala, Tete, Gaza, Inhambane, and Maputo, based on the March 2016 SETSAN report). The drought led to failed harvests, particularly of staple crops such as maize, resulting in dramatically increased prices for key food items (on top of a currency crisis) and leading to reduced access to food by the poorest households in affected areas. Due to the magnitude of the situation, the

⁷These include but are not limited to the Mozambican Association for the Development of Rural Women (AMRU), Organization for Integrated Socio-Economic Development (KULIMA), Association for Community Development (KUGARISSICA), and Association for Social Development (ADS). http://www.funae.co.mz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=152&Itemid=70&lang=en (accessed 21 May 2017)

⁸ http://www.mz.undp.org/content/mozambique/en/home/operations/undp_un.html (accessed 17 May 2017)

⁹ These include the World Food Programme, Food and Agricultural Organisation, United Nations Environment Programme, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations Development Programme, World Health Organisation, and UNICEF. Other major international development organisations, donors, and financial institutions involved include: World Bank Group, African Development Bank, UKAID, Japan International Cooperation Agency, US OFDA, Sida, and ECHO.

¹⁰ http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-mozambique/civil_society/international_ngos/ (accessed 20 May 2017)

Government of Mozambique called for intensified actions for affected populations, including the distribution of funds planned for emergency situations and mobilization of resources to provide immediate, life-saving, and life-sustaining assistance to the population affected by droughts through the provision of essential commodities and support for the restoration of livelihoods through resilience-building activities. Figure 3 captures the extent of this drought in terms of percentage of cultivated area affected by drought/floods based on data from April 2016.¹¹

2.5 COSACA History

During the 2007 and 2008 floods, Concern, Save the Children, CARE, and Oxfam worked collaboratively to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their humanitarian response. This two-year collaboration resulted in the establishment of the SOCC Consortium in 2009; and later transitioned to the current COSACA Consortium. While the four agencies maintain independence and autonomy, the Consortium today jointly works on preparing for and responding to natural disasters affecting Mozambique's most vulnerable communities. The partner organizations collaborate on several diverse activities, including partner training, research and context analysis, development projects, and coordination of emergency response. Working through this Consortium has allowed the four agencies to leverage the unique technical skills and geographical reach to more effectively and quickly respond to the needs of vulnerable communities.




Figure 4. Cultivated Areas Affected By Drought (April 2016)

Based on experience gained through these initial cooperative efforts, COSACA received DFID funding from October 2013 to September 2016 (extended to the end of November 2016) for a project entitled "Floods Emergency Response." A "Preparedness and Drought Response Project" was also funded by DFID from mid-December 2015 to end of October 2016 (with an extension until the end of November 2016).¹² This phase of funding and implementation has been completed and was often referred to as COSACA I. COSACA II, the focus of this evaluation, was funded by DFID (July 2016-March 2017) and SIDA (July 2016-June 2017) and is discussed in the next section.

A final evaluation of COSACA I (October 2013-November 2016) focused on programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Specific areas of review included: coordination, communication, and collaboration; skills and competencies; pre-positioning of resources/logistics; and

¹¹ Mozambique: Drought. Situation Report No. 4 prepared by the Humanitarian Country Team/Office of the Resident Coordinator in Mozambique, 10 June 2016

¹² January 2017 IDNIL Final report on COSACA I

monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning. Geographically, the evaluation concentrated on eight districts in two provinces: flood response in Zambezia Province (Mocuba, Nicuadala, Namacurra, and Maganja da Costa Districts) and drought response in Gaza Province (Guija, Chibuto and Mabalane and Chicualacula Districts).¹³

2.6 COSACA II: Current Approach

In response to the recent drought, COSACA designed a strategy with a funding goal of nearly \$77 million between July 2016 and April 2017, aiming to reach up to 500,000 people. This integrated strategy targeted the six worst affected provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Tele, Manica, and Zambezia) with interventions in three primary sectors (Food Security and Livelihoods, Nutrition, and WASH). The expected impact was to ensure children, parents, and caregivers are able to meet basic needs to enable a healthy and dignified life at all times without engaging in negative coping mechanisms.

The Consortium approached several donors (UKAID, SIDA, ECHO, and USAID) for funding, mainly for food assistance and the support for protection and restoration of livelihoods. A contingency budget was also emphasized to facilitate an increase in voucher values to better cover household needs. The COSACA Consortium aimed for an integrated programme management and implementation structure. While partners adhered to their respective institutional administrative and financial procedures, this integrated COSACA approach was intended to better guide governance mechanisms to implement best practices in programme and project management, which in turn would reinforce consensus building and collaboration among the Consortium partners.

An overview of project activities by location and implementing partners can be found in the table below:

Provinces	Districts	Activities	Implementing Partner
Tete	Changara	Seeds & Tools	Save the Children
		Nutrition	Save the Children
Gaza	Guijá, Chicualacuala, Mabalane, Chigubo	Seeds & Tools	Save the Children
		Food security	Save the Children
		Wash	Save the Children
		Livelihoods	Save the Children
		Child Protection	Save the Children
Inhambane	Funhalouro, Mabote, Govuro	Seeds & Tools	Oxfam
		Food security	Oxfam
		Wash	Oxfam
		Livelihoods	Oxfam
	Funhalouro, Homoine	Seeds & Tools	CARE
		Food security	CARE
		Nutrition	CARE
		Livelihoods	CARE
Manica	Machaze	Seeds & Tools	Concern

¹³ January 2017 IDNIL Final report on COSACA 1

Provinces	Districts	Activities	Implementing Partner
		Food security	Concern
		Wash	Concern
		Nutrition	Concern
Sofala	Chemba	Food security	Oxfam
		Seeds & Tools	Oxfam
		WASH	Oxfam
		Livelihoods	Oxfam
Zambézia	Nicoadala, Morrumbene	Food security	Save the Children
		Seeds & Tools	Save the Children
	Mopeia	Food security	Concern
		Seeds & Tools	Concern
Maputo	Magude, Namaacha, Matuine, Moamba	Food security	Oxfam
		Seeds & Tools	Oxfam
		WASH	Oxfam

Table 1– COSACA Project Activities per Location, Sector, and Partner

COSACA Baseline (Midline) Assessment

DFID's funding of COSACA II began in early July 2016, but it was only in October that four locations were identified for a baseline assessment. This *Emergency Response Baseline Study* assessment was conducted in December 2016 and consisted of a desk review, 24 key informant interviews, eight focus group discussions, and a survey targeting over 1,200 households in Maputo, Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia. The assessment aimed to: 1) establish the values for all outcome and output indicators; 2) add baseline values to review log frame results and update targets for assessing project effectiveness; and 3) establish baseline values for mandatory indicators in log frame thematic areas. The baseline report is dated January 2017, so considering this assessment is not, in fact, baseline data, but more a midline evaluation (this is discussed further in later section).

3.0 Rationale and Scope

COSACA sought an evaluation to generate evidence to measure effectiveness of drought response interventions throughout the intervention areas. This evaluation was meant to measure the effectiveness of the consortium-style design of the intervention, specifically looking at internal coordination between partners. As such, the evaluation involved COSACA members, COSACA implementing partners, local government officials, and beneficiaries and looked at the various activities implemented by COSACA partners, with a focus on food security, vouchers, and seed and tool distribution, as well as the functioning of COSACA as a Consortium.

The purpose of the evaluation was to serve both learning and accountability purposes by assessing COSACA's performance to practically and conceptually improve the future design of similar programming. The evaluation provides lessons learned and recommendations to be used internally within COSACA; by the Mozambican government authorities at national, provincial and district levels; and by other humanitarian agencies, national and international in Mozambique and abroad.

Further, the evaluation aimed to assess both the technical strength of the project and the extent to which the COSACA II humanitarian response met their objectives; to measure the extent to which the response was appropriate for the affected populations; to recommend improvements for future interventions, focusing on program and management quality and accountability, contributing to learning in a wider sense within the COSACA Consortium; and to assess the projects' value for money. To achieve this, the evaluation encompassed the aforementioned six primary criteria: appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage, internal coordination, and external coordination.

The final evaluation was both retrospective and forward-looking, including an evaluation of past performance, analysis of lessons learned, and conclusions and recommendations for future interventions of a similar nature. We evaluated program aspects throughout the entirety of the COSACA II, from July 2016 to June 2017. To do this, we focused specifically on three critical program intervention areas, listed below. While the evaluation prioritized beneficiaries and their experience, as well as a range of vital activity programs – including food assistance, e-vouchers, seed distribution – within these critical areas, we have also assessed the activities of all implementing partners – Save the Children, Oxfam, CARE, and Concern. In addition to looking at specific program activities and the indicators discussed, we sought to learn about the coordination between Consortium members to determine the advantages and disadvantages to designing response interventions in this manner and to highlight lessons to be learned to guide future project planning.

After initial discussions with the COSACA team, it was decided that the evaluation would take place in the following locations, allowing for the greatest breadth of coverage possible in the time allocated while ensuring coverage of all major activities and implementing partners' programming (see Figure 4, next page).

- Gaza: Mabalane (Save the Children)
- Inhambane: Funhalouro (Oxfam - Funhalouro Tsenane and Tome and CARE - Funhalouro Sede)
- Zambezia: Mopeia (Concern)

Mabalane was selected due to the presence in the district of both Save the Children and the World Food Program (WFP). Funhalouro was chosen as it hosts two implementing partners (Oxfam and CARE) and experienced tension in the approval process, therefore it theoretically could offer insight into aspects that other sites did not experience. Mopeia was selected as it was the most recent location added to the program and is still undergoing seed distribution by Concern, one of the Consortium partners.

Evaluation questions were designed according to the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. We included questions concerning Relevance/Appropriateness (Is this program the right one for mitigating the problems at hand?), Effectiveness (Are the program objectives being achieved?), Efficiency (Are resources being used economically?), and Coverage/Impact (What is the effect of the intervention in proportion to the overall situation?). The fifth primary criteria, Sustainability (Are the positive effects sustainable once programming has been completed?) was not included as a stand-alone subset. However, questions regarding sustainability were included for the appropriate respondent populations. Evaluation questions covering the criteria can be found in Annex II. In addition, we included questions that specifically sought to gain insight into coordination between Consortium members to determine the advantages and disadvantages to designing response interventions in this manner: Finally, as Value for Money served as the final evaluation of COSACA II programming, we included analysis of this. To do so, we used the “3E’s” approach to assessing the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of the program and the connection between cost and performance. Using this methodology, we attempted to develop evidence-based analysis of the value of both the overall program and individual activities.




Figure 5. Location of Research Sites (Mabalane, Funhalouro, and Mopeia)

4.0 Methodology

4.1 Research Approach

The COSACA II evaluation was essentially completed over three weeks, from 4 to 27 May 2017. The evaluation was solely qualitative and included a combination of desk research, focus groups with beneficiaries, and key informant Interviews with government authorities, community leaders, COSACA points of contact (PoC), vendors, and other important stakeholders. A qualitative-only approach was selected due to the time constraints for delivering a final report to project stakeholders; with additional time, a quantitative component could have been included. However, qualitative research garnered a large amount of information in a short period of time. The methodological approach to this evaluation is outlined below.

4.2 Research Methods

Step 1: Desk Research

Key documents and relevant project material, as specified by the COSACA Consortium, were reviewed to better understand, conceptualize, and evaluate the project. This phase was important in informing the evaluation design, scope, and instruments, and continued throughout fieldwork and writing to guide analysis, reporting, and to serve as a guide for reviewing program achievements of defined themes.

Step 2: Development of a Robust Evaluation Design and Evaluation Instruments

As stated previously, the evaluation design was created to measure relevance, coverage, impact, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, coordination and cost analysis. As field research evolved, the evaluation team would often probe in additional areas beyond the field, which in turn broadened the analysis to include important external variables that influence programming, implementation, and coordination.

Step 3: Sample Development

Focus Group Discussions

A total of 18 focus groups were conducted across these four areas with beneficiaries of differing demographics and program participation. Each group included a total of 4-12 participants. A full breakout of focus group composition can be found in Annex III. All FGD participants were beneficiaries of vouchers and/or seed distribution under COSACA programming. While the primary focus for all group discussions centered on food security and voucher/seed/tool distribution, some also included questions on health, nutrition, WASH activities, irrigation, and insect issues.

Respondents were carefully selected from lists of beneficiaries provided by the implementing partners. All possible respondents of a specific demographic (for example, male) who fit a specific criteria (for example, participated in the e-voucher program) were listed. The implementing partners contacted the selected individuals to request their participation. If any were unwilling or unable to participate, they were replaced with another beneficiary of a similar profile from the list of program beneficiaries. Only one person per household was eligible to be selected to participate.

One FGD was conducted with orphans under the age of 18. Community leaders were in the neighborhood when the discussion occurred, and had approved the participation of the youths. A Concern staff member was also in the neighborhood, and had organized the respondents for the discussion.

Key Informant Interviews.

We completed 35 key informant interviews (KIIs), with 28 interviews in the program districts and 7 key informants in Maputo. The interviews in Maputo were with individuals associated with the project from

NGOs operating in the area, such as WFP, and key staff from each of the four COSACA implementing partners. These interviews provided valuable information on all evaluation questions, particularly external coordination questions and an assessment of coverage and appropriateness. In all of the categories listed above, we relied on COSACA to provide names of individuals who were directly involved in the response, including those at differing levels of responsibility within each category. This ensured that the evaluation team could obtain an in-depth understanding of the larger picture.

Step 4: Interviewer/Moderator Training

High quality research relies on training that emphasizes good interview techniques and proper data quality controls. Our Mozambican moderators have received extensive training on qualitative methodology from us in the past, and refresher training prior to fieldwork to discuss the specifics of this project, logistics, and goals. All evaluation team members working in Mozambique signed-off on a Child Safeguarding protocol prior to beginning fieldwork.

Step 5: Fieldwork

Two teams worked to complete the sample in Funhalouro, Mabalane, and Mopeia. Fieldwork in Mopeia and Mabalane occurred simultaneously with two teams. Each team included trained moderators, translators, and an experienced individual to manage quality control, lead KIIs, and observe FGDs. Fieldwork outside of Maputo was completed in 12 days.

Step 6: Analysis and Reporting

Our qualitative analysis identified, examined, and interpreted patterns and themes that help to answer the aforementioned evaluation questions. This process was on-going and fluid and began with the desk research phase of the project. Notes from the FGDs and KIIs were sent to the Lead Analyst as often as possible; and upon receipt, the lead analyst in conjunction with the two Team Leads, conducted manual coding of the notes to follow emerging trends and themes as they arose. This facilitated building an evaluation report in a more rapid fashion, but also enabled adjustments and better data collection approaches to be employed in the field.

Given the short timeframe, we also relied on investigator triangulation to cross-check data for accuracy. This type of triangulation involves several different individuals in the analytic process, examining the same methods and observations and then combining information from all sources – desk research, FGDs and KIIs – to carefully vet information and flag anything that appeared to be an outlier.

We relied on manual coding because we analyzed notes taken from groups and interviews as opposed to recorded transcripts. Thus, we conducted thematic review instead of content analysis, grouping collected information into patterns that help to answer the research questions. The communal nature of these communities often led to a unified voice and affirmation from all FGD participants. If a participant remained silent, the evaluation teams remained cognizant and probed deeper to identify dissenting opinion. We looked for interesting stories from respondents and how these stories might provide key insight into themes that were emerging.

4.3 Quality Control

As a team, we have extensive experience conducting qualitative research in complex and fragile environments. As an important part of this process, we institute multiple layers of quality control, which starts when we engage and train local interviewers and supervisors and continues throughout the fieldwork and data analysis phases. To reduce bias amongst group participants, we split groups by gender. Our past experience in Mozambique has shown that this is necessary to allow all participants

equal voice. We also separately asked the two Team Leads to independently compile a list of relevant themes emerging from the sites they oversaw, and found that they corresponded well, regardless of the research locations.

4.4 Limitations

This evaluation was limited by time. In an ideal setting, an evaluation of a programme with this scope (four partners in four provinces), would entail several months devoted to developing a comprehensive inception report, piloting interview/FGD guides, conducting a minimum of three weeks of field research in multiple locations within all four provinces of focus, and several weeks to draft the report, develop findings/recommendations, and make revisions as necessary for the final report.

As stated earlier this evaluation was effectively conducted in less than one month. This is an unusually short timespan for an evaluation of this nature. The time constraints in completing this project restricted the team to visiting only critical pre-determined locations covered by the four partners. Further, it restricted choice of research methodology solely to qualitative work as quantitative data collection can take more time. In addition, we would have preferred to include control locations that did not receive program interventions to offer a means of comparison that would better highlight the benefits of the COSACA Consortium response. However, research permissions in non-intervention areas can take weeks to obtain. Thus, we limited the scope of the evaluation to areas in which COSACA has a relationship with government and community officials so as to mitigate this issue.

In an ideal setting, an evaluation of this nature would include time to pilot FGDs and KII guides and make necessary corrections, resulting in a well-tested, succinct, and more rigorous qualitative approach. Due to the extremely short evaluation time-frame for this report, evaluation teams made necessary corrections and/or adjustments to the guides while in the field. Daily communication between Team Leads kept each team apprised of conditions, findings, potential themes, challenges, and solutions. Regular communication with the lead analyst assisted in keeping the entire team onboard with developments in the field. This condensed time-frame affected the scope of how much could be included in this report.¹⁴

Additional limitations relate to the quality of COSACA funded reports used for the desk review, the availability of key stakeholders for KIIs, and scope of the evaluation. For example, the baseline evaluation was conducted more than halfway through the DFID-funded portion of COSACA. This is problematic in that it occurred late and primarily provides little useful data for endline comparison. This partially explains why a qualitative-only approach was utilized for this evaluation. This report also lacked any information on the survey questions, KIIs, FGDs, and other relevant information, despite being referenced as available in the report's annex. More helpful documents included the DFID second quarterly report and the final evaluation of COSACA I. PDMs, PMs, and other minor reports helped with filling in some of the gaps, as did the final COSACA proposal submitted to DFID.

Time constraints also forced key informant interviews to be conducted at all stages of the evaluation, i.e. during the logistics phase, field research, and preparation and revision of the first draft. While COSACA was extremely helpful in organizing many of these KIIs, important key informants were not interviewed. For example, important interviews missed included: COSACA MEAL manager, former COSACA programme directors, DFID personnel, INGC staff at the Provincial and National levels,

additional UN Humanitarian Country Team members, SETSAN staff, and additional non-COSACA member NGOs working in the same provinces.

Finally, this evaluation's scope was limited to only examining food assistance fairs and seed/tool distribution activities. COSACA II also included WASH and child protection components, but due to a condensed evaluation timeframe, these activities were not evaluated. Reference is only made when focus groups mentioned these activities.

5.0 Findings

The following findings sections each present relevant background from internal COSACA documents regarding eight key themes, and then each section highlights the key findings from the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The Background section in this report has already introduced some of the goals of COSACA, which are further fleshed out here. At times, the findings support the background documents, while at others they challenge them. The following themes were categorized by respondents' responses and triangulated with the internal documents and are each discussed in turn:¹⁵

- 5.1 COSACA Coordination
- 5.2 Politics Of and Around the Project
- 5.3 Survival Mechanisms
- 5.4 Beneficiary Lists
- 5.5 Food Distribution Fairs
- 5.6 E-vouchers
- 5.7 Sustainability
- 5.8 Overall Impact of Food Distribution
- 5.9 Value for Money
- 5.10 How These Findings Fit With Prior External Evaluations

5.1 COSACA Coordination

This section highlights prevalent attitudes from key COSACA points of contacts both in Maputo and in the research locations. While it describes in depth the challenges faced by the implementing partners, one consideration should be duly noted up front: **the food distribution worked**. One COSACA affiliate noted: *"if you look at on the ground impact, food assistance, we achieved what we wanted to achieve. But some aspects of the multilevel [process] were not as stellar as they could have been."* A key question in the conceptualization phase was how to best target beneficiaries, particularly with the knowledge that resources are limited and all households couldn't receive assistance. Another aspect involved the complexity of CARE coordinating a cyclone response on top of a drought response across more than four organizations (including Oxfam's and CARE's implementing partners) and multiple donors in a country with a government that experiences severe challenges in responding adequately to emergency situations, particularly when the situation is as dire as what was experienced in the past year.¹⁶ Overall, however, **COSACA is now viewed by the Mozambican government as a key partner in emergency response**, with its combined technical expertise and the respective agency strengths, which added to the value of the Consortium and contributed to the effectiveness of the

¹⁵ For confidentiality purposes, all attributions are kept at a minimum regarding demographics of respondents. For example, two quotes from "Government staff member, Funhalouro" are not necessarily the same person for both quotes. This was done to allow respondents to talk candidly about their experiences. Transcripts and notes from the FGDs and KIs have been given to the COSACA lead agency, to ensure validity of responses. These documents will not be shared outside the agency, in order to keep the respondents' names confidential. The background information in these sections stems from desk review documents, particularly the Quarterly Reports, Post-Distribution Monitoring reports, COSACA's final DFID proposal, a report on the e-vouchers, and powerpoint presentations about COSACA.

¹⁶ One COSACA affiliate in Maputo indicated that this was the first time the government was faced with a drought of this scale, and thus the INGC struggled with the red alert, as there were no indicators for a slow onset. In February 2017, Cyclone DINEO hit the coast of Inhambane and impacted the district of Funhalouro (Inhambane province). This emergency slowed down the activities in this district due to wind and heavy rainfall, which cut off roads in the district and caused damage to local infrastructures.

overall drought response.

This section therefore acknowledges the complexity of this response and the fact that it did indeed work, while also describing the challenges faced. The coordination themes generally fell under the following four categories, with each discussed in forthcoming sub-sections: (1) The Consortium Management Unit (CMU) and Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) Teams; (2) Disconnects: Geographical and Related to Roles and Responsibilities; (3) Donor and NGO Coordination; (4) Continuing with the Consortium.

The Consortium Management Unit (CMU) and Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning (MEAL) Teams

CMU

The COSACA structure is comprised of the National Steering Committee, made up of the four agencies' Country Directors (or delegates) and the COSACA Program Director.¹⁷ Save the Children was responsible for overseeing the necessary negotiations and formally communicating decisions to actors at the different levels. The Consortium Management Unit (CMU) manages the implementing partners' commitments to strategy, oversees the operational coordination between members, and ensures grant compliance.

In response to the drought and the opportunity to scale up the previous program, COSACA revised the overall governance and management structure of the Consortium to improve its effectiveness as a delivery mechanism, making COSACA more accountable to beneficiaries and donors. This reshaping was intended to ensure consistency across all implementing partners in the level of technical quality. The CMU was also to be responsible for harmonization and coordination of technical approaches between the agencies, yet respondents indicated that the reality differed to the intentions.

The CMU evolved between projects, where structures changed to incorporate a large management unit, so as to accommodate the increased amount of resources and the complexity of overseeing numerous donor projects. One respondent indicated that the number of donors involved made management *"uncoordinated and haphazard"* and *"most of the CMU staff were contracted to Save the Children, and although they tried to identify and define roles, it wasn't implemented efficiently"* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo). Another indicated *"the CMU was not well managed and lacked the right skills and competencies"* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo). One COSACA affiliate felt the CMU was too focused on DFID, when it instead could have been working for all donors.¹⁸

Several high level managers in each of the organizations would coordinate with their own field staff, and CMU personnel spoke with other agencies' field staff, but there existed a gap with having one focal person to coordinate insights into what was occurring at the local level:

"There needs to be a focal person to streamline the information, and avoid CMU personnel

¹⁷ The Program Director's team included a Grants and Finance Manager, a Government Liaison Officer, a Communications Coordinator, and the Operations Managers.

¹⁸ Another affiliate further explained that over the history of COSACA I and II, there were four program directors, with the second director having exceptionally strong coordination abilities, yet he didn't stay in the position. Elaborating further, he said that typical management skills require only a vertical focus, i.e. managing up and managing down, but successful coordination requires an additional horizontal focus that can be difficult (COSACA affiliates, Maputo).

directly burdening field staff with requests for information and agreeing to things without the oversight of the Emergency Team Leader and Emergency Team Coordinator. You learn so much when things go wrong. It didn't go as we wanted it to go, we can do better in the future, but there was a lot of stress. I felt like the CMU was there to chase me, not support me." (COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

Additionally, a core CMU team doesn't exist for the periods of time that are not considered emergencies, when in fact, this could alleviate some of the problems experienced. For the future, one affiliate in Maputo noted that whoever manages the program needs "coordination, diplomacy, and influencing skills, and a lot of patience."

MEAL

COSACA's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system had as a goal to use the M&E tools across agencies to collect information and make programmatic adjustments where necessary. Each COSACA agency was to have MEAL officers/coordinators responsible for gathering, verifying and inputting data from their organisation. M&E activities would theoretically include regular monitoring visits to communities and households; house-to-house verification during targeting and implementation periods; post-distribution surveys of communities and markets after vouchers and seeds/tools have been distributed (to provide beneficiary feedback on aspects such as level of satisfaction with the timeframes, quality of food distribution, expectations on vouchers, and how to make a complaint); and collection of nutritional data.¹⁹

COSACA's MEAL manager was responsible for sharing tools (baseline, price monitoring, post-distribution monitoring, and indicator performance tracking) across the partners in order to align methodologies. Some agencies employed their own MEAL coordinators who added their own activities to ensure data was collected to meet individual agency logframe needs.²⁰ Respondents indicated, however, that the capacity wasn't there in the CMU regarding who should lead on MEAL overall: "The MEAL people, that was a real headache, the way the tools were designed, we gave feedback but nothing changed." (COSACA affiliate, Maputo) While data collection occurred, and at least one MEAL staff member in the field indicated that communication was adequate, others noted that some MEAL staff didn't necessarily have the strong analytical skills necessary to fully inform solutions.²¹ In contrast, one MEAL staff member in Maputo indicated that the tools were indeed developed by technical experts, MEAL staff ensured that the questions responded to the indicators, and tools were regularly updated (the last update being December 2016) with donor inputs. Not all staff were present throughout the entire process (discussed further below in regards to turnover), however, leading to some confusion.

There was also no repository of MEAL documents and tools, and some tools (e.g. evaluatory) were too

¹⁹ MEAL officers monitored the complaints to ensure there was a response to such issues as quality of services, corruption, and misconduct.

²⁰ Agencies that have MEAL coordinators/officers: Save the Children (Gaza and Tete) and CARE. Agencies that do not have MEAL coordinators/officers: Save the Children (Zambezia), Concern and Oxfam. One MEAL staff member in Maputo indicated that technical support was difficult in the areas where the agencies didn't have a MEAL staff member (most of the agencies recruited field officers to do MEAL work, but some allocated other activities to them, such as the e-voucher rollout, leading staff to be somewhat overstretched, though still with support.

²¹ One COSACA affiliate in Mopeia indicated that "the indicators and number of surveys that such a multiple donor and activities program requires makes it pretty much impossible to set up global MEAL tools for all the projects/districts. Each donor pushed for its preferred indicators and type of survey and at the end everyone had to do everything and that was not feasible and required higher level of MEAL skills and support."

long (COSACA affiliate, Mopeia). Respondents indicate that MEAL staff were generally tracking down information, rather than ensuring that the process was working smoothly and providing support. There was little clarity on why certain data were being collected and coordination on dates, and some staff members seemed stretched beyond their abilities with little high-level technical support. Additionally, there was little sharing of experiences regarding what worked and what didn't (COSACA affiliate, Mopeia) other than initial methodology and the aspects involved in the food fairs.

Disconnects: Geographical and Related to Roles and Responsibilities

Some respondents indicated there existed a further disconnect between the management unit and operational staff at the local level, rendering it difficult to replicate across organizations. This was further compounded by the geographical location of the COSACA trailer on the leading organization's compound (Save the Children). Key partners indicated that COSACA staff should have been housed in one area to allow for daily interaction, and that the Consortium should have been distinguished as independent from the leading organization. One affiliate suggested that the staff affiliated with COSACA also needed to clearly understand that they work for the entire Consortium, not for the agency housing them.

Additionally, numerous respondents noted that there was a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities. This was problematic given COSACA's sheer size and ambitious mandate, and compounded for some by the cyclone response occurring on top of the drought assistance. *"The cards are kind of stacked against it working, I think it was hampered by leadership and the [lack of] establishment of basic coordination mechanisms that would have helped."* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).

Many of the key stakeholders were based in Maputo, and the structure became relatively top heavy:

"The country directors (CDs) should meet to make top key, strategic decisions, and the operations people should be doing implementation and discussing operational matters and only refer to the CDs for final decisions. The meetings were happening at the top and didn't go down, and it wasn't the best use of CD time to decide operational level details." (COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

Additionally, field staff was limited, and one affiliate in Mopeia noted that COSACA would have benefitted from employing one specific agricultural coordinator to oversee all the agencies (some positions within COSACA were difficult to fill, and therefore staff from the agencies had to cover the gaps).²² Overall, because many of the positions were short term, there were difficulties in recruiting qualified staff. Additional challenges arose from finding qualified technical staff and specialists who were fluent in both Portuguese and English. Staffing was therefore challenging.

Donor and NGO Coordination

COSACA coordinated with other actors on all levels (national, provincial and district) in designing, assessing, and implementing activities, as well as sharing training and awareness materials. At the national level, the Consortium played a key role with the humanitarian aid mechanism, which significantly aided the national response and brought about greater program efficiencies.²³

²² The original CMU structure had a FSL Advisor who was meant to work across all agencies, but that recruitment failed several times. Hence the Concern Program Director at the time tried to fill the gap, but given the workload it was not possible to do so in the way envisioned (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).

²³ A coordination mechanism governed by a Memorandum of Understanding with the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Food Security and the National Institute of Economic Activities was established. This document stated that the government was responsible for coordinating all humanitarian activities, information sharing, monitoring of prices, and the

Discussions with these partners took place on all three levels in order to determine priorities, selection criteria, target populations, and activities. At the provincial and district levels, COSACA participated in coordination meetings led by the National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC), while at the district level it worked with partners such as the INGC and the District Services of Economic Activities (SDAE).²⁴ Respondents indicated, however, that relationships with government staff (particularly the INGC) differed across sites, in part due to government attempts at favouritism and working in their own interests (discussed further below). One successful example occurred in Gaza, when the INGC gave a Letter of Recognition to COSACA for its partnership.

Coordination also occurred with other agencies in the targeted areas in the attempt to avoid duplication of efforts, and ensure programming filled the gaps of needs. At the national level, COSACA coordinated via cluster coordination meetings. The World Food Programme (WFP), which helps to build capacity within the INGC, initiated a Protracted Relieve and Recovery Operation in Gaza in September 2015, initially with limited assistance. Regarding coordination of key entities in humanitarian response, the partners indicated where they wanted to intervene, but WFP and COSACA worked in the same areas in Gaza, resulting in a duplication of efforts. One staff member indicated that coordination with the government was difficult, in part due to the Mozambican government's desire to maintain the perception that the country is on the right track so that donors remain in-country. But *"you can only do what the government wants to do. They give a yes or no for all humanitarian aid"* and this contributed to issues related to covering what needed to occur with a government that is still in the process of learning how to coordinate various humanitarian aid responses in emergency situations.

Because COSACA was funded by four donors (DFID, ECHO, SIDA, and OFDA), it resulted in different project end dates. This further rendered coordination difficult and required numerous evaluations (rather than just one) utilizing different evaluative frameworks and templates. The seed distribution was also done at different times with a lack of coordination (COSACA affiliate, Mopeia).²⁵ The response was therefore *"like four different projects, not just because of different member agencies, but different ways of working"* and therefore the point of a Consortium—to streamline processes—was not entirely apparent (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).

Funding itself was also deemed challenging by some, as it traveled to the partners' head offices outside of Mozambique first, then was disbursed to the country offices and partners, a process that several affiliated indicated was too slow. Funding delays also affected payments to vendors, as noted by one COSACA affiliate in Funhalouro. Additionally, the disbursement of funds for at least one component (nutrition) was delayed, causing a delay in activities.

Donor desires were also identified as challenging. One COSACA affiliate in Maputo indicated that the processes required by funders didn't match the nature of the response: *"It's emergency funding, so it shouldn't be so bureaucratic, as timeliness is key."* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo) Another indicated that there were *"more demands than normal on a program like this,"* which may have stemmed in part from

quality of seeds and food at the fairs. As part of the wider strategy, the Consortium learned from challenges to ensure that feedback occurred across multiple levels of government.

²⁴ The research team was unable to meet government staff members at the provincial or national level due to time constraints.

²⁵ Initial attempts to coordinate seed procurement were unsuccessful as each implementing partner tried to support the local economy and thus plan and source locally. This led to different contexts and timelines for each of the partners (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).

the perception by one COSACA affiliate that *“we were overzealous in the proposal, we were doing everything for everybody.”* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

The overall challenge for the Consortium was to act as one body when:

“Each organization has its own principles, policies, so sometimes things are delayed because they have to follow their procedures. That contributes to not having the reports on time, mainly the finance reports, they are written here and then they have to go to each headquarters, they give feedback, that takes a long time, so the dates agreed on, they don’t follow.” (COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

Others noted similar issues in the timeliness of activities, for example with grants management, where energy might have been better spent *“on more pertinent issues such as making Cosaca operational, having a program director in place who could engage with the provincial managers, and detecting issues at the provincial levels that compare across regions”* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).

COSACA affiliates in Maputo and Mopeia indicated that there weren’t enough meetings or adequate circulation of minutes from the CMU members and this led to feelings of alienation when instead staff should feel that they are a part of something larger, sharing experiences, and working within the Consortium. Whilst the meetings between the four agency Country Directors worked well, when CMU meetings did occur, often there was no set agenda or enough advance warning on dates. One Maputo affiliate also indicated there was no agreement on cluster representation, so COSACA wasn’t represented in all forums by technical expertise, and notes were not shared among the Consortium to keep everyone informed. One differences in attitudes was noted regarding whether communication was successful both within and between organizations: some staff members in the field indicated that feedback did indeed occur successfully, while others in Maputo disagreed.

There were also initial issues (later resolved) with coordination with government in certain areas. One government affiliate indicated that:

“The partners initially seemed to think they could do everything without government, but then they realized they couldn’t. Just because it was an emergency. We tell them what they have to do is submit a proposal to the government and the government approves on it. I was very involved in all of this with the two organizations, we had to call a discussion with them, to involve government. But by the end it was ok and there was a good relationship with everyone.” (INGC staff member, in the field)

A Maputo-based representative from a United Nations agency stated that coordination issues overall are rampant across Mozambique. The government faces numerous challenges within the national level of government, but also down to the provincial and local levels. Agencies, including COSACA partners, often have to wait for government approval, further exacerbating delays in emergency situations.

Continuing With the Consortium

Despite the challenges encountered, COSACA affiliates noted similarities to the desk literature: COSACA has a high profile in the country and is generally *“considered one of the biggest, if not the biggest, humanitarian actor, with huge reach in terms of geographical areas, technical expertise, and ability to mobilize resources and staff.”* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo). Almost all COSACA staff members saw the value in continuing with the Consortium, despite the several issues encountered.

One of the implementing partner staff members noted that the added value of working in a Consortium was that the funding was shared in this type of humanitarian work and that the agencies involved are generally large ones, which is both positive and negative in the sense that they have wide reach, but are also burdened by their own mandates. Another COSACA affiliate noted the overall importance of having a collective entity: *“that voice that was there in terms of pushing for cash based interventions with government, we couldn’t have done that on our own.”*

5.2 Politics Of and Around the Project: Favoritism, Conflict, and Tensions

One of the challenges, particularly in Funhalouro, was government and/or leader involvement attempts to overlook targeted vulnerable individuals in favor of family members or friends, or *“trying to put their noise [comments] into the program negatively.”* (COSACA staff member, Funhalouro) Yet this went farther than the attempts to place favoured individuals on lists, as some also tried to utilize the project to their political advantage:

“Another challenge is that whatever you wanted to do the food fair and it’s a national or public holiday we couldn’t give the food to the population because the government wanted to do their part in it, after that we could try to give them food. So we were supposed to let the people go hungry because the government wanted to do their addresses to the population. (COSACA staff member, Funhalouro)

“The government, during the implementation of this process, wanted to do political work and put into the minds of the population that they are the ones providing this assistance. ...They would take this chance also to try to take some advantage regarding the ruling party and the opposition party, ‘this food is not [from] the opposition party...it is this party.’ (COSACA staff member, Funhalouro)

Some leaders also felt they were put in difficult situations in choosing beneficiaries because initially many community members felt it was for political reasons, rather than following a set of specific criteria.

The flare-ups in civil conflict over the past two years in certain parts of the country (particularly near Funhalouro) also presented challenges for certain residents, as they were wary of travelling to the bush to look for seeds or collect wood to sell, due to the presence of hidden Renamo soldiers (who they claimed were still present at the time of fieldwork, even with the Renamo-Frelimo ceasefire). When asked why the HIV rate was so high in one particular community in the area, one point of contact indicated it was due to the military’s close proximity.

Finally, the SETSAN reports created challenges.²⁶ One point of contact noted that after discussions about the reporting, DFID and COSACA agreed to follow the SETSAN figures, while another noted:

“We were working on the ground and the reality was completely different. In those provinces, they didn’t have rain for three years, one wasn’t more vulnerable than the other, because all of them had nothing to eat. So then the government didn’t want us to move out of the areas that

²⁶ These were a series of reports conducted by Mozambique’s Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition, and offer figures on levels of food insecurity. The Mozambique government eventually requested that organizations use the September 2016 report as the official one. One affiliate in Maputo noted that *“the SETSAN figures were disputed by some district and provincial authorities as they complained they hadn’t gone everywhere and the figures were not ... validated at the local level before going to Maputo for approval.”*

we were in, and we said 'but look at this report,' and it became an issue" (COSACA point of contact, Maputo).

One 2015 report indicated that several hundred thousand Mozambicans were starving, and within a few months that number jumped to over one million, yet there were no differences in criteria. In Funhalouro, a highly sensitive district, there were challenges experienced in the targeting of the beneficiaries: The September 2016 SETSAN report underreported the number of Mozambicans that required assistance while local authorities had different figures and claimed that SETSAN did not cross-check the information with them. As per DFID's guidance, CARE reduced the number of beneficiaries in Funhalouro in December, but government intervention hampered this reduction (regarding the acceptance of such reductions). This was resolved through a series of discussions and advocacy to explain the reasons for the reduction and why the selection criteria was crucial.

Unintended Project Effects in the Communities

With the exception of Mabalane focus group participants, beneficiaries of the drought assistance felt targeted by non-beneficiaries because they received help while others did not. Jealousy and tension included idle insults (*ticano*), shunning individuals, theft, and threats ("you should die, you shouldn't receive food."). If a secretary in a community asked for assistance with something (for example cleaning a school), some non-beneficiaries refused, claiming that the beneficiaries should be the ones to engage in activities that require energy. Community members talked about encountering these types of issues, particularly in the beginning when others didn't understand why they had been chosen:

"The limited resources we had to help people, there were clashes within the communities, there were some people according to our criteria that were worse than others. The beneficiaries were vulnerable to the neighbors who weren't getting food. In the first phase we had these issues, instead of just the beneficiaries coming, the whole community came, we are also facing this problem, they promised to fight with the ones who got food, we will rob them, we will beat them, every day we would hear stories about someone getting the feiticeiros [traditional leaders who cast harm on individuals] involved." (COSACA staff member, Mopeia)

"If you have a problem with someone, they say, 'go ask 'Rice and Mealie Meal' to help you, I can't help you.'" (Female orphan, youth under 18, Mopeia)

Another unintended effect was related to the market system and competition: some payments were delayed, which put vendors in a difficult situation. Some relied on bank loans to acquire products, and if the payment wasn't delivered on time, this created a difficulty with the bank and they couldn't participate in the following month's food fair (COSACA partner staff member, Funhalouro). Finally, one respondent noted that monkeys thwarted some of the best laid plans: if cassava was planted and the monkeys came for it, they would remove the plants and throw them around the machamba (Orphan, youth under 18, Mopeia)

Although communities experiences some challenges, sharing food with non-beneficiaries alleviated some of the tension, and many respondents stated that they did so, predominantly with extended family members and neighbors. Female beneficiaries in Mabalane even mentioned that they would approach single-headed households and request a loan of their food items, promising to pay back the items at a future date. Part of this rationale stemmed from a strong sense of shared humanity, likely mixed with a bit of guilt. Respondents noted such things like *"I was dying because of hunger. I shouldn't eat while my neighbour has hunger"* (Woman, 62, Lua Lua) or *"I couldn't eat properly if someone would come*

and see me eating when he doesn't have any food" (Community leader, Funhalouro)

5.3 Survival Mechanisms: 'We Have to Risk Crocodiles'

COSACA internal documents indicate that prior to the COSACA intervention, communities had embarked on a number of coping mechanisms. These included, among others: shifting from cereal production to livestock, selling charcoal, migrating with cattle, migration to South Africa, reducing the number of meals from three to one or two per day, eating wild fruits, and selling assets. Child labor also increased, as children were taken out of school.

The most cited response from respondents for how community members survived during difficult times was *"digging for roots"* or *"collecting fruits."* Such roots, known as *xikutsu*, *ncuancua*, *myanya*, *nyika* or *malava*, are not nutritional, but serve the purpose of filling one's stomach and are not toxic (see Photo 1). Foraging for such sustenance is not without its difficulties, however, particularly when it comes to encountering, or in some cases competing, with wildlife:



Photo 1. Seeds to Eat (used in times of hunger) Funhalouro, May 2017, Credit: K. Fenio.

"There is a root called malava that people would dig from the ground to survive. There is something like a potato, it grows in the water, it's called nyika, we have to risk crocodiles to get to it. We use this as an alternative when there is nothing to eat. Malava is cut like onions into small pieces, you put it in water for the next day, then you take it out, wash it again, then it's ready to be cooked." (Community leader, Lua Lua)

"We go to try to get some roots (xikutsu), we prepare it, dry it, and drink it as a tea. This tea has some negative effects because our eyes become swollen and the tummy of the kids becomes bigger. And we have to fight with the monkeys." (Female, Funhalouro)

"My mother was bitten by a snake and died during the cyclone and left a young child. Locals were asking where the child was when she went for the roots—the child is still alive. Two people died, including my mother, the other one was bitten but didn't die. This happened while they were looking for roots." (Female orphan, 16, Mopeia)

Focus group participants in Mabablane and Funhalouro reported eating the roots of the *xikutsu* plant/tree, but this resulted in diarrhoea and other stomach issues, with some women indicating they had to visit a hospital. Preparation entailed grinding the roots into a paste-like substance, drying it, and then reconstituting it into a tea-type beverage. An agricultural specialist in Mabalane confirmed that this plant was common in the area and was used to supplement local diets if more common food substances were not available.

Petty trade was also a survival mechanism, particularly for those who do not own livestock. Respondents indicated they cut trees; sold cashew nuts, charcoal, firewood or traditional beer; went fishing; or asked others in the community for assistance. Some also indicated that they sold what they could from their *machambas* (small gardens) in order to acquire money. For those in Mabalane and elsewhere, the drought resulted in substitutional loss in livestock, due to lack of grass and other feed. It was not unusual to hear beneficiaries talk of losing half, three-quarters, and even in some cases, all of their livestock (cows, goats, and pigs). Respondents mentioned the difficulty of even raising chickens, as they primarily feed on maize, which was not available during the drought.

There was little difference between types of beneficiaries and coping mechanisms, but a few aspects are notable: widows had less help in the *machambas* and were therefore cultivating less (as respondents indicated that men, women, and children usually all assist in the *machambas*). One disabled male indicated he has been limited in his ability to generate income as he has only one arm, so he cultivates his *machamba*, collects firewood or cuts grass (Disabled male, 46, Mopeia).

Other programs in certain areas do exist for community members, particularly through the INGC's *Comida pelo Trabalho* (Work for Food) program. Specifically targeting community members who are able to work, the program trades food for work hours. Workers clean areas in their neighbourhoods, assist in road maintenance, and perform other such tasks. One INGC staff member noted that the program began when the government raised the red alert in the country, as a means to try to help (although by that time the drought was already well underway).

Those who have few other options rely on other community members for assistance (also discussed later), either via direct requests for food and/or a request to cultivate in their *machamba*. Throughout all discussions in the field sites, respondents indicated that water (both for drinking and for irrigation) remained a key issue, and that the communities face challenges in borehole rehabilitation, often pooling their money together to pay for a specialist to fix boreholes.

Because of their experiences during the difficult times and that COSACA had such a positive impact in their lives, all beneficiaries stated how thankful they were to have had COSACA in their communities (this is discussed further in the final section).

5.4 Beneficiary Lists

Drought-impacted communities targeted by the emergency response were identified based on SETSAN data. In light of funding constraints, COSACA prioritised consolidating its programming in areas where implementing partners already had a presence to allow for a more cost efficient and rapid delivery of assistance.

After choosing areas, COSACA worked with communities to identify the most vulnerable households using SETSAN's criteria for beneficiary selection. Targeting considered the need to ensure safe and equitable access to nutrition, water and food security/livelihood programmes for women and the most vulnerable groups. Beneficiary criteria were therefore agreed to include those with a maximum land access of 1.5 hectares, no livestock assets (excluding poultry), the elderly with responsibility for children, child-headed households, households headed by widows and/or single mothers with young children, households with a chronically ill member, households with a disabled member unable to work, pregnant/lactating women, and households with more than one child under two years of age. Exclusion criteria included households who have at least one member employed by the government or private sector, and households that have a business, petty or large trades.

Beneficiary targeting occurred in consultation with local authorities and leaders using participatory methodologies to identify vulnerable families facing the worst food insecurity. The time pressures were notable and created an even more challenging situation: there *"existed a trade-off between quality of selection and delays to implementation that could not be avoided. I think most agencies were aware of the 'challenges' with targeting but were unable to address it exhaustively due to need to start food delivery"* (COSACA affiliate, Maputo). COSACA made it a priority to continue to address inclusion and exclusion cases in terms of targeting criteria, but this remained a challenge, in part because the

Consortium invested time in working with the appropriate vulnerability criteria (endorsed by the INGC at the national level), but the acceptance of these proved somewhat challenging at the provincial and district levels). When local authorities had to act impartially (discussed above), the agreed criteria was contentious and required additional efforts to acquire a consensus.

Respondents were somewhat mixed on the success of the beneficiary lists in identifying those most in need, citing issues with government involvement (as either positive or negative), favoritism, and difficulties in verifying who were actually the most vulnerable community members. Political rivalry also came into play; one COSACA point of contact noted “some leaders advised us not to go to certain areas because of security issues. We would get a car ready to go, they would say don’t go, there are clashes, and we found out later on these weren’t true.” (COSACA staff member, Mopeia)

Organizations found ways around fraudulent activity, but also encountered additional challenges. In Mopeia, as per the COSACA methodology, door to door verification was necessary due to errors in the list-making exercise. If there were more than 10% errors, the list was redone, and two community lists were redone in this site because they were deemed fraudulent due to the leader attempting to include family and friends on it. Several community leaders throughout the areas indicated they went door to door to verify cases. In Funhalouro, CARE was required to reduce the number of beneficiaries that were initially receiving food, in order to match with the SETSAN figures, and this led to additional tensions between beneficiaries and former beneficiaries.²⁷ In this process, the organization collaborated closely with community leaders to assist in the selection, the Mozambican National Institute for Social Action (INAS, with lists of those receiving government subsidies), the INGC for food

Text Box: Complaints From Some

“They start thinking I need to put my family there. We have a complaint mechanism, but it didn’t work so well. There are people inside the community who clean it for cases like that. We have community staff to help us with that. ...After the complaints we would have 10 days to give feedback. It worked, but not very well. At the beginning there were a lot of complaints—from people who weren’t getting it...We have agriculture officers in the field...[they see] the leader has his kids in the program, it’s not correct. We talked to people in the community about what is happening.... Reviewing the selection criteria, who really needed it...When the project was going on, we could see ‘no this one doesn’t need it, another complains why don’t I get it?’ But it was late, because there were many people receiving assistance then we had to reduce the number.”
(Cosaca staff member, Funhalouro)

assistance, and SDAE for seed distribution. The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM, Oxfam’s implementing partner) found it easier to circumvent government requests for “favorites” to be included by initially appeasing them (“I had to pretend to say yes and then change it”) and then discussing the names with the community members. The residents would then approve or disapprove of the names, allowing the CCM to back up their choices with community approval.

There were complaints in all communities about who was chosen and who was left out (Text Box).²⁸ But

regardless of challenges with beneficiary lists, many respondents indicated that the assistance went to the appropriate areas. This was due in part to identifying areas that had, at the very least, some ability to assist themselves, such as many cows, a way to produce, or geographical proximity to water. Other

²⁷ The September 2016 SETSAN numbers were low for Funhalouro, indicating that at that time, 2,250 HHs were food insecure. One COSACA affiliate in Maputo indicated that this number didn’t match up with the reality on the ground, and therefore made it seem like COSACA was overtargeting. DFID then requested the reduction.

²⁸ The Complaint References Mechanisms process is based on humanitarian standards for quality and accountability in order to create a communication channel for community members to give feedback on the program. Internal COSACA documents indicated that a majority of beneficiaries said they are aware of the complaints mechanism.

areas were then deemed more vulnerable in coordination with the external entities.

One respondent suggested the possibility of mapping out communities to further improve the selection process.²⁹ It is important to highlight, however, that locations in general were selected together with the government which had information about the most affected locations (Cosaca affiliate, Maputo), and that at least one organization (Concern) conducted a mapping exercise with the government and visited key areas in Machaze and Mopeia (COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

Involving the leaders in the process was often beneficial, at other times, problematic, and it created problems for the leaders themselves, as some indicated they were accused of not helping everyone. One government official noted that CARE did not involve the leaders in the beginning of the process (which was later rectified), *"thinking they could do it themselves, while Oxfam involved the local leaders in the process. Later on CARE involved the local leaders, as they saw the difficulties involved."* (Government official, Funhalouro)

Finally, some focus groups had respondents in them who owned more than 1.5 hectares of land and/or livestock (other than poultry), indicating that these criteria were not applied in certain cases. Other than these two, however, the rest of the criteria fit the demographics of the focus group discussants and COSACA partners did well given the emergency situation.

5.5 Food Distribution Fairs

COSACA employed a market based approach in this intervention in an attempt to support local markets and ensure market actors could maintain business during a crisis period, by using established supply chains and theoretically reducing costs of assistance delivery. It was initially envisioned that this would occur through monthly food vouchers for food fairs in order to provide local supply and choice for beneficiaries (when direct cash transfers were not authorized by government). Assessments determined that market based modalities were appropriate in the Mozambique context.

The voucher system allowed households to purchase food from selected suppliers based on the basic food basket composition for a household composed of five members. This included maize, beans, rice, salt, oil, sugar, and sometimes spaghetti. During early intervention planning in 2016, in close coordination with the INGC and in line with the WFP's recommended value for food baskets, the voucher value was determined. Food basket and voucher values were streamlined across COSACA partners, to ensure that beneficiaries reached through the program received equitable support. As per the exchange rate at the time, and based on price monitoring in different areas, this was calculated as 3200 meticaís (about US\$42). This later increased to 3800 meticaís (US\$50) because of food price inflation, covering a minimum of approximately 1100Kcal/person/day of energy needs for a family of six (more than the COSACA target to provide for a family of five), but it was agreed not to reduce the value of food assistance, as it was anticipated that additional food price increases would occur as hunger deepened.

As beneficiary targeting included vulnerable households, the emergency response designed measures to ensure their inclusion and reduce barriers to accessing assistance. The voucher fair delivery mechanism allowed beneficiaries, including youth headed households, to send representatives to receive assistance on their behalf (this fact was corroborated by several beneficiaries). There were

²⁹ One COSACA affiliate indicated that this was done. How widespread this was across organizations, however, was unclear.

multiple fair sites in the districts in order to try to mitigate long travelling distances. From the beginning of the project, COSACA envisioned a travel contribution to beneficiaries to help with transport costs for those incapable of accessing assistance without it (with varying success, discussed further below). Food fairs occurred each month (starting in September 2016), but delays in recruiting staff and procuring vendors meant that full capacity was not reached until December.³⁰

In some areas, vendors for the fairs were chosen based on their participation in previous COSACA projects, so that a new tender did not need to be launched. In other areas there was a tender launched at the district level and neighborhoods. Few suppliers applied, however, due to the limitations of financial resources. In Gaza and Inhambane, there were seven to nine vendors when the project started, but this number increased in order to allow for more buying options, boost local economies, and meet the increased number of beneficiaries in COSACA II. The initial plan was to contract numerous suppliers to increase choice, but this was difficult due to access issues (roads), conflict in some areas, and the low capacity of some local vendors to meet demand. Vendors were informed two weeks before each fair on how much food to bring, based on the number of beneficiaries and vendors attending. The National Inspectorate of Economic Activities (INAE, which controls and monitors prices), the INGC, the local administrative authority, and the police were present at the food fairs.

A process for price setting existed, but it fluctuated depending on region. INAE worked with the implementing partners and vendors prior to the fairs to agree on the prices of the goods and during fairs, INAE monitored sales, making it more difficult to over-inflate prices (COSACA affiliate, Maputo).³¹ In some instances, COSACA implementing partners were able to push back when they felt prices were too high, and some COSACA affiliates indicated they did not pay more than others for product. If vendors complained and tried to increase the prices, the organizations reiterated that the government had set them, and therefore no deviation could occur.

In Mopeia, the COSACA points of contact questioned the vendors' intentions when their prices were perceived to be high, thus prohibiting a competitive market. In Mabalane, vendors, community leaders, and even some beneficiaries said it was difficult to determine the exact cause of perceived price fluctuations. Perceptions included: natural price increases to market fluctuations, drought-induced shortages, and international exchange rate differences.

Prior to each fair, beneficiaries were informed about the process, choice of products, prices and how to use the vouchers. They were also encouraged to inspect the food products available for quality and price. In some instances, vendors tried to entice beneficiaries. The implementing partners had to stop this and re-educate the recipients about having a choice on which vendor buy from (even if there were few choices, given that there were only a handful of vendors per fair).³² At one point, CARE asked vendors to do a more pre-prepared food kit which the partner could better control to ensure beneficiaries didn't receive less. This was also deemed less time consuming by some respondents.

³⁰ Initially, food assistance was delivered through paper vouchers, with the e-voucher system commencing at various points, depending on location, after the project had begun.

³¹ "If INAE said that the peanut that was going to be sold in [one locality] should not cost more than 50 meticals/kg, then the vendor had to sell it at that price. This helped us argue the case against speculative vendors. And many of the vendors even bore costs themselves of for example fixing the road so that they could transport the goods, as our fairs gave them guaranteed sales." (COSACA affiliate, Maputo). One to two weeks prior to the day of the fair, INAE was informed of the date so as to send a representative to attend to ensure the prices applied by the vendors were within the accepted market value.

³² This was noted as a normal challenge for rural programming, and that the implementing partners tried to include as many vendors as possible, but capacity prevented many from participating.

There are certain attributes to the food distribution fairs discussed above that were also highlighted by respondents across communities particularly regarding the costs, distance travelled to attend, theft, and perceptions of prices.

Overall, several COSACA affiliates indicated that the fairs were the most expensive part of the emergency assistance, which is to be expected given that the vendors needed to transport the goods to rural areas, often along poorly developed dirt roads.³³ At the same time, the fairs were deemed less expensive than any type of in-kind assistance. While the fairs were held in what were considered to be central locations (more or less), this didn't alleviate the hardship that arose for those community members who were required to walk long distances. One indicated she *"left at night, went on foot to Mopeia. Left at midnight from here, got there early morning. We went along the road because all the shortcuts were full of water."* (Female, Mopeia)

The organizations implemented transportation for the beneficiaries to return with the (often heavy) products to their home communities, due to occurrences of theft by those waiting along the roads to steal their goods, but they couldn't assist everyone (it was generally only those who lived the furthest away).³⁴ The thieves were often groups of idle young men who had little in the way of alternative livelihoods.

Some beneficiaries tried to find rides with drivers along the main roads, but this posed other challenges with theft:

"Normally they charge us 50 or 100 [meticaïs] to get a ride. Another option is to give the driver the food, to drop off the food somewhere near our place, but sometimes he doesn't drop all the food. And because we are walking we only realize the food is not complete when we have arrived home." (Female, 48, Funhalouro)

Vendors indicated that they did well financially in participating in the fairs (and at least one Mopeia vendor is constructing a new concrete shop from the increased volume of his business). One vendor indicated he offered incentives—often soap or spaghetti—to the beneficiaries in the attempt to generate more sales:

"With the paper vouchers, a beneficiary would come and say I will buy only rice from me, the other items I'll buy from another vendor. Then in order to stop him from leaving my shop for another shop, I give him a discount. In the beginning of the e vouchers, it was possible for them to buy from different vendors. But then at the end it was difficult because when we would give extra food, the beneficiary would then buy everything from us." (Vendor, Mopeia)

³³ One COSACA affiliate in Mopeia indicated that other factors were also involved, such as frequent flooding and security (vendors had to travel through checkpoints and attacks of food/humanitarian trucks have occurred in the past during emergencies). The vendors also did not know how much product they would sell in the fairs and in order to participate, they needed to invest money initially. Another COSACA affiliate in Maputo noted that the fairs offered good value, as the vendors covered that transport and warehousing costs, and INAE set the prices so that they couldn't be overinflated to recoup logistics costs. The perception of the cost of food fairs may be due in part to the cost of e-vouchers, which were initially a higher cost to print and pay the monthly fee to MasterCard.

³⁴ COSACA implementing partners recognized that some of the areas posed challenges for transporting beneficiaries as there would not be public transportation. Therefore, a transportation allowance was covered. The threshold, however, proved challenging to the implementing partners (e.g. initially CARE used a threshold of 40 kms whereas Oxfam used 7 kms, but these were later harmonized to use the same distance).

One specialist noted that vendors could also bribe children to tell beneficiaries to purchase from him, and that the government had to stop such activities (Agricultural Specialist, Lua Lua). Yet leaders were in on it too at times: when community leaders attempted to persuade beneficiaries to purchase from certain vendors, COSACA implementing partners successfully resolved this by intervening.

Finally, COSACA beneficiaries were not the only community members to benefit from fairs and the surrounding areas. In Funhalouro, some individuals came with other products to trade. Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries did this, which allowed for the benefits to spill out into the general community.

5.6 E-vouchers



Photo 2. E-voucher, Mopeia, May 2017, Credit: K. Fenio.

Food assistance was initially given using paper vouchers, printed on a monthly basis according to program needs. The COSACA partners wanted to switch to e-vouchers (see Photo 2) and therefore had been in discussions with the government to approve an e-voucher modality, because it was determined that the electronic system would more efficiently deliver the goods, tops ups would be easier, and reduction in fraud would occur due to more (es).³⁵

A few months into the project, e-vouchers were introduced, which posed challenges as the Consortium had not previously used them. Yet they provided beneficiaries with an opportunity to enhance their decision making on food items. There were also benefits from the speed of the system (being faster than the paper vouchers), report generation, and payments. Beneficiaries received e-cards with their identification details, and the amount of the food basket was uploaded to the card. This led to greater efficiency as it was helpful for the vendors to access data indicating the exact amount of stock sold during the fair, and allowed for better planning for future fairs. The voucher value was adjusted in relation to the exchange rate in order to maintain the same level of monthly support and cover food price fluctuations (in part tied to currency depreciation).³⁶

Vendors were trained in the e-voucher system, and COSACA assessments indicate that it was successful, as suppliers were able to sell their goods. They were instructed on how to work within the MasterCard system and properly use the tablet and card reader. E-vouchers also alleviated the problem of looking for change for customers whilst they were using paper vouchers (which was often given in the form of pieces of soap). It also alleviated the need to spend time counting paper vouchers to verify product sold.

Challenges from the e-vouchers did exist, however, which would have potentially benefitted from the service provider for the e-vouchers travelling to all field sites to assist with technological issues. The

³⁵ Advantages to the e-system included the following: E-cards were distributed one time and reloaded electronically each month, days were selected for redemption of cards, the reconciliation process was shortened as transactions were stored on the tablet and uploaded online, transaction time was shortened for beneficiaries, payment times to vendors were reduced, audit trails were available for review. Disadvantages included procurement/customs challenges, beneficiaries forgetting PIN numbers, the need for continuous training to refresh beneficiaries and vendors, poor internet connections.

³⁶ Due to inflation of the metical, market prices were increasing on a regular basis, thus affecting the purchasing power of beneficiaries.

quick rollout of the e-voucher program after the fairs had begun created difficulties with implementation on the ground, as extensive, nuanced training didn't fully occur and some didn't understand the capabilities of the e-voucher platform:

"They were trained, but indeed the rollout was too rushed. We didn't even do a pilot. The delay in using the e-voucher was due to the importation of the equipment partially... also there is a whole process that needs to happen prior to utilizing the e-vouchers, such as going to the villages to take the photos of the beneficiaries, which also helped delay their implementation."
(COSACA affiliate, Maputo)

The e-voucher roll out also presented its own set of challenges for coordination. One INGC staff member indicated there were differences in voucher rollouts between organizations, and the products to be purchased for the food distribution fairs. Those staff members who indicated that it would have been better to distribute food as their own local organization (rather than partnering with COSACA) felt as such because of the way the resources were distributed and how the e-voucher system was implemented. One affiliate noted:

"The MasterCard vouchers were a big problem for us. We only get the receipt from the vendors, we couldn't manage the program, it was done by COSACA, they gave us the report on what the vendors sold. We take the info from the fairs and send it to Save the Children, then they send us the report, and then we have to pay the vendors, it takes so much time. You're on the ground, beneficiaries are waiting, it was a big problem to have to rely on Save for anything to do with the vouchers." (COSACA affiliate, Funhalouro)³⁷

COSACA points of contact in the field generally indicated that the e-voucher system was implemented too late in the project and created additional challenges:

"It caused us lots of problems...it really messed up the implementation and it was so expensive and we didn't have the capacity to do it efficiently. Sometimes we had to stay two days with no electricity and had to work with this. We didn't sleep because the machines were not working."
(COSACA staff member, Mopeia)

In some areas in Inhambane province, the introduction of the e-voucher was postponed due to a discussion about the reduction in the food assistance through e-vouchers. Additionally, at least one organization faced challenges in downloading transactions from the MasterCard platform.

In Mabalane, where Save the Children targeted beneficiaries, however, there appeared to be a highly effective and efficient distribution system and implementation of the e-voucher system. This success could be due in part to one level of bureaucracy removed from the system, as the local COSACA (i.e. Save the Children) representative could go directly to Save the Children staff leading the Consortium.

Despite these aforementioned challenges, across all communities, beneficiaries indicated they preferred the e-vouchers to the paper vouchers or the paper booklet vouchers. The few who disagreed cited problems with malfunctioning technology that required them to wait during the fairs. Satisfaction with the e-vouchers stemmed from the photo on the back of the card, which reduced the possibility of

³⁷ It should also be noted that the agencies had staff who were able to generate reports and analyze fair data. There were administrative access limitations whereby some changes had to go straight to the administrator based at Save the Children.

fraud, as well as the longevity of a plastic card versus paper vouchers. Beneficiaries stated that paper vouchers were too easily torn, lost, misunderstood, or ruined from water or sweat and that vendors could steal from beneficiaries who couldn't read. They also indicated that the e-vouchers allowed them to use all the money on the card, rather than potentially leaving the fair with money left on a paper voucher. Mabalane beneficiaries emphasized that occasionally card holders would lose their card or forget their PIN, but with the assistance of community leaders and COSACA staff, the situation was easily rectified. In general though, most focus groups participants did not experience these issues.

The point of contact in charge of implementing the e-vouchers across the locations also indicated they are easier because they don't need to be counted and *"beneficiaries can't sell them like regular vouchers."* (Specialist, Maputo) Vendors and youth also indicated preference for the e-vouchers for transparency, noting they *"show proof of what [beneficiaries] purchased so if they question it, I can show them you bought this on this day"* (Vendor, Mopeia) and *"if they rob me, I can go there again and they give me another one."* (Female orphan, youth under 18, Mopeia)

The duration of time that a voucher purchase would last varied among households. Women in Mabalane stated that the 3800mt voucher would last their household from one to two weeks. The average household size in Mabalane was nearly 8.5, yet vouchers did not distinguish between household size and were instead based on a government mandated statistic of a household size of five.³⁸ These women also highlighted that the age and sex of children determined food consumption, with older boys eating the most and small children the least.

5.7 Sustainability

In order to assist families in becoming self-supporting as quickly as possible, COSACA included a livelihoods/resilience intervention of seeds and tools. These are discussed in this section.

Seeds and Tools

COSACA originally planned to provide seeds and tools to beneficiaries through a seed fair approach implemented by all partners, but determined that the cost to do so was very high (given the price of seeds at that time) and few vendors applied. The subsequent seed package distribution was determined in part based on soil type and was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Seed distribution occurred in line with the government advised seasonal planting calendar, starting from November, though this varied by region.³⁹

Seed procurement was carried out through a national public tender, but since few vendors applied, a second announcement was released at the provincial level. COSACA selected eight vendors to supply seeds in the targeted areas, and maximum prices were agreed upon with the vendors. Some suppliers did not have a sufficient stock of some seeds (due to higher preferences for e.g. groundnuts over other seeds), so extra suppliers were contracted to supplement for this. The distribution of seeds included

³⁸ One COSACA affiliate in Maputo explained that this was investigated and calculations were made based on household size. However, due to the short implementation period and the rate of change to programming, specifically the introduction of e-vouchers, the decision was made that a further change to household size-related assistance would cause confusion and conflict, which was not worth overcoming for one to two months of programming. Initial COSACA studies indicated that the average household size in Mozambique is 5-6 people, but households in Gaza often consist of more (over 10). The e-voucher system allows for better data collection on household size, and thus COSACA can continue to examine how best to support larger households.

³⁹ Due to the lack of seeds in Mozambique, some were distributed late, but because the rains came late as well, beneficiaries were still able to plant.

maize, beans, sorghum, cereal, vegetables, and groundnuts, while tools included, among others, hoes and machetes.

Respondents generally deemed the distribution of seeds the most likely to help communities in the long run (dependent on rain). Seed distribution is also not without other challenges as evidenced by several stories highlighted in the research. While most focus group participants in Mabalane stated they were consulted on preferred types of seeds, focus group participants in Mopeia and Funhalourno indicated that they were not, though some indicated that agricultural specialists know what works well in the communities, and based decisions on this. Others indicated that community leaders visited households and asked about preferred seeds. Additionally, in Mopeia, a first round of rice seeds were old stock and didn't grow, and residents indicated they would prefer the "two month" maize seeds that grow faster than others, but are not currently receiving them.⁴⁰ Responses varied on the timing of seed distribution, with some indicating that the distributions were on time, while others stated they were a bit late.⁴¹

In one Mabalane focus group discussion the group recounted how they received seeds in December 2016 and planted them in January 2017. Unfortunately, flooding had destroyed crops. Participants mentioned that their ability to replant was based primarily on receiving additional seeds from COSACA.

One additional challenge was noted across most communities: insects are eating the crops, which puts community members at further risk of hunger. In one discussion with an agricultural specialist in Funhalouro, he suggested that insecticide is necessary to combat this, as well as having technical specialists in the communities to assist.⁴²

Tool distributions varied between communities e.g. some in Funhalouro didn't receive any while those in other areas did). In other communities, the secretary kept the tools so that the entire community could use them. In Mabalane, beneficiaries also mentioned receiving water pumps, water pipes, 20 litre jerry cans, slippers, soap, toothbrushes and toothpaste.

Overall, beneficiaries were pleased with the seed and tool distribution and optimistic about the sustainability of it.

The Communities Ask 'What next?' From Their Benefactors

The community members were all extremely thankful for the assistance provided.⁴³ In Mabalane, the local COSACA representative typically began and ended each focus group with prayers, singing, and cheering; and at the very end an impromptu celebratory dance often occurred in praise of COSACA. In contrast, FGD members in Funhalouro-Tsenane appeared thankful, and at the same time extremely worn down, and the research team noted that this community had encountered additional hardships on top of the drought and the cyclone: a few beneficiaries discussed RENAMO soldiers hiding in the bush, making it difficult for them to collect seeds, while the women discussed the high HIV rate in the area (and several women in the FGD were HIV positive). Many respondents expressed concern that the

⁴⁰ After discussions with the SDAE, some complementary seeds and tools were bought and distributed to compensate.

⁴¹ This generally matched up with Post-Distribution Monitoring reports, which indicated that majorities were happy with the timing. Large majorities also said they were satisfied with the quality of seeds.

⁴² He indicated that insecticide costs approximately 850-1000 meticals, plus the kit to use it.

⁴³ However, some communities seemed more thankful than others. For example, in Mopeia, youths under 18 years old in one neighborhood (24 de Julho) were extremely forthcoming in blatantly asking for more assistance (so much so that several community leaders approached the point of contact at the end of the focus group with youths to inquire if they would receive a benefit for having set up the group, and whether or not the group had said anything negative).

projects have ended, while a handful of respondents indicated they believe they will be able to make it successfully through the rest of the year. It remains to be seen whether the emergency situation is indeed fully over or not, as some mentioned it will depend on the harvests.⁴⁴

Those who worry expressed their concerns that the situation will return to its previous dire state and that their energy will once again be depleted from a lack of food: *"compared to last year, I can lift both legs because the food was enough, but this year I think I may only be able to lift one leg because the food is not enough.* [Woman taking care of orphans, Mopeia]

Others took a more optimistic stance on future sustainability, stating that they *"are expecting something this year, it won't be as bad as before, we should have food for ourselves"* (Community leader, Funhalouro) and *"Now we have peanuts, maize, beans, almost everything we planted, they are growing nicely. We have something that we can use up until December"* (Government staff member, Funhalouro). While Mabalane beneficiaries were generally optimistic, communities near the Limpopo River expressed frustration with planting seeds in the river's flood plain and then watching it be destroyed when water from the greater Limpopo water shed was released upstream by the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Residents were given 48 hours notice by the South African government of when water was to be released, but it only took 24 hours for the water to reach the area once released (Agricultural specialist, Mabalane). These man-made floods occurred four times in 2017.

In order to counteract a mentality of waiting for handouts (which is relatively typical for a post-socialist country), capacity building remains a key concern for several stakeholders and leaders. Respondents indicated that families need to *"know how to do something, rather than wait for the government to come and give them something. We're trying to come up with some training for them, so they can do something for themselves."* (Government staff member, Funhalouro) Irrigation is one example of possible training, as was the seed distribution to allow beneficiaries to produce rather than waiting on food products. Some respondents indicated they view the government and the NGOs as their parents or grandparents, in part because of the handouts, but also in relation to democracy: *"I think the government is my father, my mother, because the time of election, they promised us whatever you are missing, I'll give you. Even if I don't get what they promised, but I have to ask them."* (Male, 68, Funhalouro)

In keeping with the themes of sustainability and capacity building, Mabalane beneficiaries and community leaders highlighted the hope for additional development projects. They emphasized the importance of emergency relief and food distribution as a short-term solution to an immediate need, along with the desire for long term sustainability programming.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ With research on beneficiaries and programming, it is a challenge to determine how much is stated in the attempt to receive more free benefits. While many respondents were forthcoming in stating that the communities should be able to make it through the next eight months, many more indicated that they still need assistance. It is virtually impossible to disaggregate from the latter how much of this is due to ongoing drought versus regular poverty within these communities.

⁴⁵ In one area of focus, communities located near the Limpopo River wished for greater assistance with developing the potential for irrigation in farm areas not affected by flooding (both natural and man-made). COSACA has supplied some communities with water pumps and water pipes, but male beneficiaries stated that the price of fuel was prohibitive, enabling them to only afford to pump for a limited amount of time. During the drought, it was even more imperative that they have funds to purchase fuel. Some farmers suggested electric pumps were more efficient, but this was entirely dependent on the availability of electricity, a rarity in Mabalane.

5.8 Overall Impact of Food Assistance: 'A Vehicle Without Fuel Cannot Run'

Although this was an emergency response that came together in a condensed time period, and despite the challenges that have been discussed, the project as a whole had **an extremely successful impact** within the targeted communities. Virtually all respondents indicated that **without it, there would have been numerous deaths**. In short, *"they were starving, then they got something that keeps them alive"* (Community leader, Funhalouro). Mabalane beneficiaries noted such ideas as *"COSACA is our father and mother. We could not survive without COSACA."* While there is no way to ethically test the hypothesis that individuals would have died without the intervention, the majority of respondents—both on the ground in the field sites and those in offices in Maputo—indicated that the situation constituted a severe emergency that required rapid assistance before it became even more dire. **All beneficiaries, community leaders, and staff members in the field further expressed relief and extreme gratitude for the humanitarian efforts.**

The points of contact agreed that while the communities are resourceful, as discussed above, the combination of drought, hunger, and the cyclone was too much for them to handle alone, particularly after several years of poor harvests. *"Without food I can't go to the machamba [to cultivate my crops]. 'A vehicle without fuel cannot run'"* (Disabled male, 71, Mopeia). Effects of the drought included theft and children unable to attend school due to a lack of energy:

"The life of people changed so much because before the program they would see that people were malnourished and there were a lot of people who were stealing from others, violence because of hunger. We could see kids also giving up going to school. We could see other kids getting married at the age of 16. Some were forced, some were not. They were not planting cabbage, tomatoes, and salads. Women couldn't rest properly before because they were working too much to get food for the children. After the program they had returned to rest, [conduct] domestic work at home, and they had food at home." (COSACA staff member, Funhalouro)

When asked about the short-term and long-term impacts of the intervention, a Mabalane local leader responded *"In the short-term, COSACA assisted with solving the problem immediately by supplying food to prevent hunger. In the long-term COSACA helped by supplying the seeds to plant and keep living sustainably."* Another local leader stated that the COSACA intervention was balanced and timely in providing resources; and there was good coordination and communication, with COSACA informing local authorities and making visits to the local farms.

One point of contact from the Consortium noted that not only was there **a clear physical change in the appearance of community members, but some marital relationships also improved** as husbands no longer felt pressure to migrate to South Africa to *"work there in order to provide something to their people. The program introduced a healthy lifestyle and some diseases had reduced."* (COSACA staff member, Funhalouro) Others corroborated the extremely positive impact the program had on domestic relationships because it alleviated adults *"running away"* from the household to places like South Africa, only to *"forget their families"* back home (COSACA partner staff member, Funhalouro). Some indicated that it wasn't only the men who had been leaving, but also some women, and thus **the project helped prevent divorce in the communities.**

Mabalane beneficiaries mentioned that during the drought some malnourished children had to drop out of school. Other children were forced to work at producing charcoal or other livelihoods to assist their families in making ends meet. Several beneficiaries throughout the field sites indicated that **children**

returned to school after food security issues had been sufficiently addressed by COSACA.

Respondents offered different ways to show their appreciation during the research in the field sites, much of it occurring with singing and dancing (particularly in Mabalane). In Funhalouro, female beneficiaries sang an upbeat song that revolved around a key phrase: *“If it wasn’t for CARE, what would we be at this time?”* One chronically ill woman further noted that COSACA *“took really good care of us, and they helped us a lot, and I don’t know if it’s a man or a woman [in charge of the organization], the person really helped us...they really helped us.*


5.9 Value for Money Analysis



Throughout this evaluation, we incorporated Value for Money (VFM) analysis using the “3E’s” approach to assessing the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of the program and the connection between cost and performance. Using this methodology, we aimed to develop evidence-based analysis of the value of both the overall program and individual activities. The key to this analysis rests in determining whether or not the program achieved the desired outputs at the most effective costs. To complete the following analysis, we relied on support from the Consortium and documentation such as budgets and both intended and reached target numbers of beneficiaries. Qualitative indicators included in the focus group discussions and key informant Interviews offer additional insight into programmatic output in more descriptive terms. We did not focus on project equity through this evaluation but have included some qualitative data to speak briefly to this indicator below.

Overview


Based on documentation provided in May 2016, overall project spending was under budget. DFID approved spending was £13,751,593. Total spending on all aspects of the program – including administrative, management, and activity costs – was £13,683,786.47, a difference of £67,806.83. At the time of publication of this report, some program activities were not yet complete; thus, these budget totals represent project spending between inception and May 2016.

As the time of reporting, the under-budget spending was seen in both administrative/management components and activity components; while there were certain line item costs that were over budget, total spending within each component remained under the approved spend.





As seen in Figure 9 below,, administrative/ management costs accounted for 16% of the total budget. A majority of funds (84%) were directed towards program activities.



Note that program activities continued throughout the evaluation period. Further, Sida funded WASH and seed programming was extended through June 2017. Thus, the analysis on economy, efficiency, and effectiveness was completed using a combination of program data submitted (covering the period of July 2016 – March 2017), qualitative findings, and input from the COSACA implementing partners. As such, we have not included data to show program achievement compared to target indicators.

Economy

Analysis of program economy focuses on the economy of inputs, primarily fixed costs such as labor, capital, and overhead expenses. Ensuring program economy entails maintaining competitive pricing for all activities and assessing whether project funding has been allocated in the most optimal way. To achieve program economy, particularly within a Consortium setting, the following cost-saving mechanisms are possible:

- Sharing resources such as transport, training staff, and administrative/management overhead between implementing partners working in the same area
- Limiting high costs, for example, timing implementations appropriately and sticking to planned intervention timelines to limit transport costs.
- Assess whether resources have been allocated in an efficient way across pre-defined indicators. For example, which program activities received more than the allocated amount of funding? Which received less? Is there a balance between these overages and under-spends that maintains integrity of the desired impact?

At the time of reporting, project economy was achieved in at least four areas: WASH latrines for schools and health facilities; food assistance, distribution of vouchers, including all costs for car rentals and fuel, community mobilisers, and volunteers; food assistance, translation of materials; and nutrition activity, value of vehicle rental against the project budget. In all four of these areas, the amount spent on activities was less than the approved budget at project inception. As mentioned above, note that this takes in to account budget spent at the time of drafting the evaluation report and does not account for spending for ongoing activities.

Two activities used more of a percentage of the overall budget than originally allocated: food assistance (value of voucher printing and smart cards in Y1 against budget) and food assistance (value of e-voucher set up and operations against budget). The reason for this overspend, according to the COSACA implementing partners, was due to an increase in the number of households receiving assistance in Gaza and Zambezia inline with SETSAN figures. In addition, the basket cost for vouchers increased from 3,200MZN (\$42) to 3,800MZN (\$50) at end of November due to inflation. As the time of the evaluation, these budget overages were offset by underspending on the aforementioned activities. Translation costs for food assistance materials, was originally budgeted too high; spending was adjusted to reflect the actual number of translations needed. This underspending helped to offset overspending on other program activities.

Despite the budget alterations with more money being spent on some items and less money in others than originally intended, all economy indicators were achieved. According to quarterly reports provided by COSACA, implementing partners engaged in joint procurement, for example in the procurement of the e-voucher system and necessary equipment. This allowed the Consortium to maintain competitive prices on goods through bulk purchasing. Additionally, COSACA partners maintained a strong relationship with INGC, which allowed the Consortium to obtain tax exemptions on the e-voucher system and to store stock in INGC warehouse spaces, eliminating the need to pay WFP a higher price for use of their storage facilities. While the cost savings from these efforts may be small in comparison to the total budget, they demonstrate that COSACA partners have attempted to work as a cohesive unit to limit costs and improve project economy.

Efficiency


Program efficiency in the VFM context is defined as ensuring that funding is spent wisely, on the right things, in the right areas. Efficiency indicators for COSACA II include the total number of individuals or households that received benefits of the programming compared to the targets set at project inception. These indicators also include the total number of achieved awareness and other campaigns or assessments against the pre-set targets.

At the time of the evaluation, COSACA II had achieved program efficiency in several areas, according to IPTT documentation for the period of July 2016 to March 2017. According to this document, more than the target number of households had received food baskets through market integrated support. In addition, project efficiency had been achieved in the number of people receiving direct hygiene promotion and child protection messaging; the number of people or households receiving water purification chemicals; and the number of livestock owning households receiving vaccination campaigns and training. Further, program efficiency was achieved in the number of child protection awareness campaigns conducted. Again, we have not included specific numbers to show the total achieved against initial targets as programming is ongoing. Note that the limited timeframe allocated for this evaluation did not provide time to further understand the reasons the over achievements of these activities.

As of May 2017, as previously stated, WASH and Seed activities were given an extended completion date of 30 June and thus are still underway. Project indicators such as the number of schools and health facilities in which WASH facilities have been rehabilitated against the target; the number of water sources rehabilitated or repaired; the number of water user committees formed against the target; and the number of individuals benefitting from seed systems and/or agricultural input activities had only been partially achieved. If these activities are completed by the extended date, all but one indicator (planned number of rapid livelihood and market assessment) will have been met, indicating good program efficiency. At the time of reporting, only four of the planned 6 rapid livelihoods and markets assessments had been conducted and we found no information to suggest that this activity was ongoing.


In looking at the line-by-line budget documents, it is clear that the majority of program spending was directed towards Food Assistance activities. This was partially due to the increased numbers of households in need of this support, for example in Gaza, as mentioned in the Economy section above. Removing the Food Assistance budget from the total activities allocation, we see that spending was divided according to the target beneficiaries defined for the activities. The two charts below show this breakout.

Figure 10. Program Activity, Percentage of Total Budget Spent




- Activity 1: WASH
- Activity 2: Food Assistance
- Activity 3: Livelihood & Resilience
- Activity 4: Nutrition
- Activity 5: Child Protection

Figure 11. Program Activity, Percentage of Total Budget Spent (not including Food Assistance)



- Activity 1: WASH
- Activity 3: Livelihood & Resilience
- Activity 4: Nutrition
- Activity 5: Child Protection

The majority of spending was completed in Q3 of the project, as seen in the chart below. This indicates that the projects worked to consolidate resources early on in order to have a larger impact in terms of numbers of beneficiaries reached and total successful interventions. This also indicates that lessons learned early on in the project were incorporated as the interventions continued, again with the result of maximizing impact.



Effectiveness

Program effectiveness, the third “E,” is the most important level of analysis; if the program is not having an impact on the target community then value for money is non-existent. To assess if the program has met its desired outcomes, thus indicating that funding has been used effectively to promote the aims of all stakeholders, we look carefully at whether or not the program reached its intended audience.

In analyzing program effectiveness, we looked at data provided that showed the percentage of individuals or households benefitting from program activity against pre-set targets. At the time of the evaluation, several indicators had been met. This includes the percentage of households able to meet and maintain their basic food and water needs against target; the percentage of households that had access to adequate livelihoods support and resume livelihood activities; the percentage of cases of children aged 6-59 months or pregnant or lactating women needing any nutrition support by a health professional, including technical IYCF and CMAM services, receive nutrition support within 48 hours; and the percentage of communities where all active nutrition volunteers submit complete monthly MUAC data for all their target households. Again, as with previous VfM analyses, we have not included specific numbers to show the total achieved against initial targets as programming is ongoing. It should be noted, however, that one indicator, the percentage of cases of children aged 6-59 months or pregnant or lactating women needing any nutrition support by a health professional, including technical IYCF and CMAM services, receive nutrition support within 48 hours, showed significant overachievement against the initial target as of May 2017. At the time of this report, using IPTT data covering the period of July 2017 – March 2017, the target for this activity was 50%; the project achieved 100%. Unfortunately, the limited timeframe allocated for this evaluation did not allow for time to analyze the reasons behind this overage.

Due to the ongoing WASH and Seed activities, two indicators were only partially achieved at the time of this evaluation: the percentage of targeted beneficiaries demonstrating satisfactory hygiene practices, and the percentage of men, women and children in targeted communities having access to sufficient and safe water on a daily basis by the end of the project. As of March 2017, both indicators were close to achieving their targets, thus we assume that these indicators will be met as a result of the extension of activities through 30 June.

Project effectiveness can be felt in the positive reviews from the beneficiaries. If the program is not having an impact on the target community then value for money is non-existent. In the case of COSACA II, the intended, targeted audience was reached and had the desired effect; our qualitative data from focus group discussions with beneficiaries shows that the majority of beneficiaries felt food

distributions were appropriate, beneficial, and sufficient to last a family for around a month. Thus, the program shows good value for money with regards to program effectiveness. Sustainability of programming always a concern when looking at project efficiency; as is normal, when program funding ends, some positive benefits currently available to communities will cease to exist and project interventions that involve infrastructure development such as the creation of new water sources may fall in to disrepair and thus become unusable. However, several respondents indicated that the seeds and tools programming, which used a substantial percentage of the budget, created sustainable change. Communities are better informed about the types of seeds that grow well even in times of erratic rain patterns, and have been given drought resistant seeds such as those for sweet potatoes that will aid communities in creating basic sources of nourishment.

Overall Value for Money

Overall, the program shows good value for money in terms of project economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, despite some indicators being only partly achieved to date. Most COSACA affiliates who participated in the research indicated that, while the Consortium structure was difficult to adapt to, they would work in this way again in the future if lessons learned from this project are taken in to account to make collaboration easier in the future. Further, as previously stated, the Consortium structure allowed for cost savings through shared resources, which meant that more of the project budget went to beneficiaries instead of overhead and equipment costs. Particularly high costs, such as transport, are difficult to avoid, especially in the context of Mozambique where road infrastructure realities make this sector more expensive. Because an effort was made to mitigate these inescapable costs by sharing resources, this collaboration amongst Consortium partners improved project economy.

With regards to efficiency and effectiveness, though some aspects of the project were rolled out late and some money was lost as previously distributed seeds dried up and needed to be replaced, beneficiaries participating in the e-voucher program were very happy. They loved the e-voucher system, despite its initial headaches, because of the photo on the card, which reduced the possibility of fraud, as well as the longevity of a plastic card versus paper vouchers. They stated that paper vouchers were too easily torn, lost, misunderstood, or ruined from water or sweat and that vendors could steal from beneficiaries who couldn't read. This shift in activity from paper to e-vouchers thus made the program more effective for all beneficiaries involved. All programs experience difficulties in determining the best ways for disparate entities to most effectively work together. Now that the structure has been created, it will be easier to avoid costly mistakes such as delays in activity rollout, which would improve future program efficiency.

5.10 How These Findings Fit With Prior External Evaluations

When comparing this evaluation's findings with the baseline assessment and the final evaluation report of COSACA I, we find a great deal of data collaboration. The baseline found that food insecurity posed a serious problem for respondents across all provinces. FGD participants and key stakeholders reported they struggled to meet basic food needs. Beneficiaries also emphasized their ongoing reliance on food, seed, and tool distribution (provided either by government agencies or INGOs). The final evaluation report also found that many beneficiaries viewed the Consortium as the last alternative for their survival, suggesting the relevance of COSACA's emergency response projects.

Our evaluation does dissent with the final Cosaca I evaluation in regards to collaboration, as it was possibly over-optimistic when stating the "coordination, collaboration, capacity building and activities make the consortium a benchmark in terms of changes in response to natural disasters in the country. Therefore, the consortium is effectively functioning as a reference centre for best practices and

experiences to be replicated in other contexts.” While COSACA was effective in meeting a large emergency need, our findings suggest there is work to be done regarding internal and external coordination and collaboration. Again, this statement is made considering the challenging environment of conducting humanitarian aid in the Mozambican emergency response ecosystem.

6.0 Recommendations

6.1 Effectiveness

Vulnerable households in the targeted communities received food. Many noted that without it, there would have been death, and thus the project achieved its purpose.

6.1.1 Recommendation [for COSACA staff and Project funders]: A similar project can occur again, but with changes to make it more efficient and effective (see below)

The amount of food distributed was the same to each household, regardless of number of members.

6.1.2 Recommendation [COSACA staff]: This could potentially be re-thought, but would pose the additional challenges of tying the amount on the e-voucher to the number of members, and needing to verify the number of members actually in the household. These are likely undesired possibilities. Another option would be to determine average number of members in a household by targeted region, and adapt the amount on the e-voucher accordingly.

Beneficiaries appreciated the seed distribution due to perceived long term effects--this is the most sustainable component of the assistance.

6.1.3 Recommendation [for COSACA staff, Project funders, Mozambican government officials]: Pursue other long-term, self-sustaining programming that move from relief to development interventions. For example, train community leaders to lead demonstrations and show their community how to use limited resources (for example, fewer staple crops) to create porridge that delivers adequate nutrition. A similar program was implemented in the DRC where individuals reported being better fed simply because they were taught how to use the limited resources that were available, even in times of drought and harvest failure.

Insects are eating the crops, which puts community members at further risk of hunger.

6.1.4 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: Include either direct distribution or partnered distribution with insecticide (which costs about 850-1000 meticaís, plus the kit). Agricultural technical specialists should also be on the ground to assist the communities.

6.2 Efficiency

There were mixed responses by FGD participants on how well the beneficiary lists worked, specifically in relation to targeting the most vulnerable and avoiding government or leader favoritism. Regarding unintended effects in the communities, jealousy and tension occurred toward the beneficiaries by the non-beneficiaries and some leaders felt they were put in a difficult situation.

6.2.1 Recommendations [for COSACA staff]: Tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries will always come into play, but continuous efforts towards a transparent process can help mitigate these. The lists would benefit from increased quality control. Lists should continue to be done with INGC and community leader involvement, while mitigating the problems that arise with some leaders putting friends/family on the lists. After a list is created, it should continue to be followed up with door-to-door visits to verify beneficiaries are indeed a part of the target criteria. Currently, follow ups occur at 10%, but this could be increased to a higher percentage.

The food distribution fairs allowed beneficiaries to choose which food products they purchased, though this added time to the overall distribution conducted during each fair

6.2.2 Recommendation [for COSACA staff, Project funders, Mozambican government officials]: Further discussions could occur to share best practices regarding how much choice

to give beneficiaries. For example, prepackaged kits could assist (perhaps not for all products, but for those the communities generally use). If this is not desirable, then a system of pre-ordering could be developed, based on community norms (e.g. preference for rice over maize or vice versa).

Some community members had to walk long distances and were robbed along the way.

6.2.3 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: While COSACA has implemented steps to mitigate this, the partners might consider adopting an overall threshold on who receives transportation (e.g. those living a certain distance from the fairs).

In one site from this study (Mopeia), vendors seemed to keep the prices at a certain level, undercutting the possibility of a competitive market, whereas in other areas the government set the prices at acceptable levels.

6.2.4 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: This should be mainstreamed to be the same across all areas. Another possibility to explore could be to hold a market day where beneficiaries who live close to the central market could purchase their goods at regular prices (rather than the slightly inflated prices due to transporting product into rural areas). This would require re-evaluating the situation with vendors having the Master Card voucher phone. This could raise an equity issue, however, as those living far from central markets will face higher costs.

COSACA attempted to increase the local capacity of vendors, which was challenging given that vendors needed access to capital and storage.

6.2.5 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: There could be further discussions on the feasibility of increasing the capacity of smaller vendors near the communities so that beneficiaries could purchase food closer to their homes (but whether this would prove cost effective would need to be gauged).

Even though the system had its challenges, beneficiaries preferred the e-vouchers over the paper vouchers.

6.2.6 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: COSACA should continue to use e-vouchers. To improve the functioning of the e-voucher system, the service provider could travel to all of the field sites prior to the rollout to assist with technological challenges. There should be a period prior to the project starting whereby vendors and COSACA staff are fully trained on-site in all areas on the use of e-vouchers to ensure better problem solving.

6.3 Coverage

Coverage targeted the most vulnerable, but created tensions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

6.3.1 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: While this will always exist to a certain degree, further discussions could include the possibility of reducing the amount given to households in order to increase the number of households helped. If this is not desirable, then continuing with a transparent process (as COSACA has implemented and learned lessons from) should continue, including constant dialogue with community leaders.

The communities who received benefits were indeed in dire need.

6.3.2 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: Continue to coordinate closely with the INGC to determine which communities have alternative food assistance programs, in order to avoid any

negative effects of overlapping programs to duplicate beneficiaries. This could be done via extensive mapping exercises of where other programs exist, proximity to natural resources (such as lakes or rivers), and norms regarding livestock ownership so that all implementing partners understand how communities were chosen.

Some beneficiaries owned more than 1.5 hectares of land and/or livestock (other than poultry).

6.3.3 Recommendation [for COSACA staff]: COSACA could either revise these two aspects of the criteria or implement them in the same manner across all sites.

6.4 Internal Coordination

The implementing partners had different timelines, which affected coordination.

6.4.1 Recommendation [for COSACA leadership]: If possible, harmonize timelines so that different donor program requirements match as closely as possible.

Staffing for COSACA was hampered by individual organization needs, difficulties with recruitment, and level of knowledge in the field.

6.4.2 Recommendation [for COSACA leadership]: COSACA needs its own staff that can devote the required time to overseeing the activities of all implementing partners. There could be an increased focus on recruiting and retaining staff members who will remain in their positions for the duration of the project.

This type of emergency situation is likely to occur again.

6.4.3 Recommendation [for COSACA leadership]: As the quiet period (non-disaster time) begins, COSACA and the donors could consider retaining a core COSACA team, whereby staff can conduct preparedness, design tools, capacity build with vendors and field teams, and conduct advocacy programming. Rather than making this a project-to-project cycle, having a core program in place when an emergency occurs would allow for more effective and efficient resource mobilization.

COSACA points of contacts in the four NGOs answered to their respective NGOs, rather than the COSACA steering committee. Part of this was due to not being assembled in one geographical space. There were also challenges with coordination and communication.

6.4.4 Recommendations [for COSACA leadership]: COSACA could rent a separate space that is not housed on any of the four NGO compounds. The four NGOs should have the same criteria since the objectives are the same (e.g. ToRs were different among organizations). There could be at least one MEAL person per organization to serve as the focal point and write reports. Additionally, there could be one logframe related to all activities, and a central repository of all COSACA related documents for the implementing partners and evaluations to access them as needed.

6.5 External Coordination

Relationships with government staff (INGC) differed across sites, in part due to government attempts at favouritism and working in their own interests.

6.5.1 Recommendation [for COSACA leadership and Mozambican government officials]: There could be increased sensitization of government staff, with a promotion of linkages between national and local government to reinforce criteria and mitigate the possibility of staff members inserting their own interests into the project.

Water remains a key issue in the communities (both drinking water and for irrigation).

6.5.2 Recommendation [for COSACA leadership, Mozambican government officials, and local partners]: Borehole rehabilitation specialists are needed in the field. Discussions should occur about irrigation possibilities.

7.0 Conclusions

Overall, the impact of COSACA II programming has been substantial and successful in terms of the number and scope of beneficiaries reached. Certain aspects of the program, namely seed and tool distribution, is likely to outlast the duration of programming. Despite challenges, the intervention greatly assisted the beneficiaries, positively impacted targeted communities, and provided good value for money. Coordination between partners was difficult and faced numerous obstacles but – most importantly - it worked. Many of the challenges experienced in program implementation and internal and external coordination can be mitigated in the future by building upon lessons learned.

7.1 Effectiveness

Project effectiveness, defined as the extent to which the COSACA II evaluation achieved its purpose, has been achieved. Vulnerable communities received aid; without the aid, they would have suffered and some would have died. Additionally, beneficiaries approved of the overall effort and many of the activities including seed distribution and e-voucher purchasing options. Unintended negative effects, such as jealousy/tension in the communities between those who are receiving and those who are not is normal in crisis situations but can be better mitigated in the future by continuing to strive for a transparent selection process (an overall methodology that all follow, which largely occurred here), with additional resources at the outset to increase the support of selections processes (thus negating lengthy follow up exercises).

7.2 Efficiency

Program efficiency, or the outputs achieved as a result of program input, was mixed. The process of selection for beneficiary lists was not entirely consistent across project areas and implementing partners and in some areas, communities felt as though favoritism played an important role in selection. The food distribution fairs had issues with efficiency, as distribution from central locations left many beneficiaries in rural areas subject to transportation issues (rectified in many cases when the organizations assisted with this) and theft. Despite the technological challenges, the e-voucher system was widely seen as a successful replacement for paper vouchers, which were problematic as they were easy to lose or damage.

7.3 Coverage

COSACA II was successful in coverage, including the most vulnerable in the intervention. The areas included were chosen well, according to beneficiaries, program staff, and other stakeholders. However, the criteria for selection was not followed uniformly across all areas and thus should be revised or more aligned across regions in future iterations.

7.4 Internal Coordination

The extent to which the actions by the individual COSACA members were harmonised with each other; promoted synergy; and avoided gaps, duplication, and miscommunication was mixed. Overall, the process worked and, as stated above, the program achieved on project level appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage. One issue for future improvement seemed to be a challenged CMU, which was not managed as effectively as it could have been, leading to a disconnect between the management unit and operational staff at the local level and a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities of individuals and organizations.

7.5 External Coordination

The extent to which the COSACA II intervention and interventions of different actors (government and

national, provincial, district level; other humanitarian agencies) were harmonised with each other, promoted synergy, avoided gaps, duplication and miscommunication was also mixed and varied across geographic and program areas. In general, coordination and partnership with INGC led to cost savings and resource sharing however, in some areas these relationships were accused of resulting in favouritism with regards to beneficiary list development. Though coordination was varied with external actors across sites, COSACA made many successful efforts and cultivated extremely strong relationships among the external entities at multiple levels in the country and is now considered a crucial partner and leading force on humanitarian responses in Mozambique.

Annex I: Logframe

El Niño Drought Response in Mozambique - Promoting recovery and building resilience of drought affected people in Mozambique Log frame update with achievements as of 30th October 2016																			
PROJECT NAME																			
Note		The log frame has been updated with the progress made by the COSACA consortium as of 31st March 2017, and covers both DFID and SIDA funded activities. As requested by DFID, twelve indicators which are the priorities for the DFID funded component of the intervention are highlighted in green (see for example Impact Indicators 1 & 2 below). A maximum of three indicators per outcome/output have been highlighted. The proportion of funding for the activities under each Output from both DFID and SIDA is also noted, to make it clear where activities are jointly funded, or fully funded by one or other of the funding partners.																	
IMPACT		Impact Indicator 1	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update	Follow Up Action										
To ensure children and their families have improved (Safe, Consistent, Marital, and Solid), we also need basic needs which enable a healthy & dignified life at all times without engaging in negative coping mechanisms		% of households and their children are able to meet their basic food needs and access sufficient water	Planned	55%		65%	1. Collaboration with INGO and HCT improved during the project. 2. Emergency actors willing to extend themselves to a timely and quality response covering international standards. 3. Multisector assessments are timely, accurate and responsive to reality. 4. Emergency sites are accessible and response coordination with COSACA is effective. 5. The target groups, including women, are engaged in water provision, food security and livelihood activities. 6. The local Government is prepared and collaborative technically to promote food security and livelihood activities. 7. COSACA partners are engaged in promoting project activities.	Data collection of the final evaluation already finished. Technical evaluation report with findings and recommendations will be shared at the end of May. The impact indicators will be measured through the final evaluation findings.	Nothing to report										
		Achieved				65%													
		Source	Final Evaluation																
		Impact Indicator 2	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
		% of households with reduced number of negative coping mechanisms throughout the project duration	Planned	45%															
		Achieved																	
		Source	FOM, Evaluation reports, SETS/In report, CSI																
		Outcome	Outcome Indicator 1	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)				Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update	Follow Up Action						
		Affected households have adequate access to food and water and nutritional support to meet their own essential needs, as well as access to market, integrated livelihood activities which support their children's schooling.		% targeted communities and their children are able to meet their basic food needs and access sufficient water (March 2017)	Planned	65%				65%	65%	1. Collaboration with INGO and HCT improved during the project. 2. Emergency actors willing to extend themselves to a timely and quality response covering international standards. 3. Multisector assessments are timely, accurate and responsive to reality. 4. Emergency sites are accessible and response coordination with COSACA is effective. 5. The target groups, including women, are engaged in water provision, food security and livelihood activities. 6. The local Government is prepared and collaborative technically to promote food security and livelihood activities. 7. COSACA partners are engaged in promoting project activities.	Beneficiaries were assessed in accordance with the selection criteria in Annex 1, and they were registered for e-vouchers through LIMS in all provinces: 45,147 women, 92,025 men and 93,304 girls, 30,966 boys were reached.	Nothing to report					
				Achieved		14%				100%	100%								
Source	FOM reports, Food Basket Monitoring, Food consumption score (FCS)																		
Outcome Indicator 2	Baseline			Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
% targeted households have access to adequate livelihood support and income generating activities	Planned			65%	65%	60%	A total of 8,122 women and 8,285 men, 9,568 girls and 5,535 boys had access to water on a daily basis. This activity is still ongoing for Odam and the postal reaches number will be reported in the next phase of the report.	Odam will call focus on training the water community committees in each component and Odam partners are leading the process.											
Achieved					65%	113%													
Source	Evaluation reports that include Post-project survey																		
Outcome Indicator 3	Baseline			Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
% of men, women and children in targeted communities having access to sufficient and safe water on a daily basis by the end of the project	Planned			72%	72%	65%			80% of the people in Gaza, Inhhambe and Sofala demonstrated satisfactory hygiene practices, according to the KAP surveys done in the provinces mentioned above. Wash component was implemented only in the Inhhambe sub-district.	COSACA/Odam partners will continue the partnership with the communities (tasks in order to disseminate hygiene promotion messages in all the target communities).									
Achieved						34% population achieved, where a 21% women, 21% men and 33% girls, 25% boys													
Source	Evaluation Reports, water quality analysis reports, Monitoring forms and modules, attendance records																		
Outcome Indicator 4	Baseline			Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
% of targeted households demonstrating satisfactory hygiene practices	Planned					60%					2% of the GAM cases in Inhhambe province				This activity was not done in all targeted provinces (Inhhambe and Sofala), because of 1. Logistic issues: To do this activity it is necessary to always visit the mothers and their children in the communities. 2. Another issue is that the communities are, according to the mother's own, mother's given additional appointments to her children even though the children are of breast feeding age.				
Achieved					0	78%													
Source	Evaluation reports, field reports, KAP survey, on-premise reports																		
Outcome Indicator 5	Baseline			Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
GAM rates maintained below the emergency threshold of <5%	Planned			0%	0%	65%										21 village water user committees were formed and joined in Gaza province and 15 were formed in Inhhambe and Sofala provinces. The trained water management committees will be responsible for coordinating the maintenance and supervision of the water sources.	At the end of the project the water sources will be handed over to the government (the water department) and the Government will work with the community water committees to have safe all people that have access to water contribute with money for the maintenance of the water sources.		
Achieved				4%	0%	7%													
Source	Evaluation reports, field reports, KAP survey, on-premise reports																		
Outcome Indicator 6	Baseline			Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
Proportion of infants 0-5 months of age who are fed exclusively with breast milk	Planned			0%	0%	65%												Although more than 54,192 people increased their knowledge of	
Achieved				0%	0	0													
Source	Evaluation reports, field reports, KAP survey, on-premise reports																		
INPUTS (USD)	DFID (USD)	SIDA (USD)	Other (USD)	Total (USD)	DFID SHARE (%)														
	13,694,190	6,897,710	0	17,641,900	79%														
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTE)																		
OUTPUT 1		Output Indicator 1.1	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update				Follow Up Action							
Targeted households have sustained access to safe water (sufficient quantity) for their own consumption and improved knowledge of		# of water sources repaired, rehabilitated, modified, decontaminated and cleaned	Planned	162	168	63	1. Strong coordination and collaboration between COSACA/HCT/INGO. 2. INGO and District Level Government support COSACA initiative in collaborative planning for disasters. 3. Self turnover does not affect COSACA capacity to respond in emergency. 4. Training is effective and effective. 5. Partner organizations, i.e. INGO, CSOs, national NGOs, Government/Partners	27 water sources were repaired/rehabilitated including decontamination and cleaning. In Inhhambe and Sofala provinces and in Gaza province 21 sources were repaired/rehabilitated including decontamination.				COSACA/Odam partners will continue the partnership with the communities (tasks in order to disseminate hygiene promotion messages in all the target communities).							
		Achieved		0	15	48													
		Source	Hand over letter of the water schemes from the district water outputs, schools and health facilities																
		Output Indicator 1.2	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
		# of village water user committees formed and members are trained	Planned	163	163	63			63										
		Achieved		0	35	38													
		Source	Training attendance records, registration list of user committees																
		Output Indicator 1.3	Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)													
			Planned	67,542	64,682	64,682			64,700										
		Achieved		0	35,348	74,593													

OUTPUT 4	Output Indicator 4.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update	Follow Up Action			
> 60% of SAM and MAM cases from the target communities are identified and referred to the respective nutritional rehabilitation services	% of cases of children 6-59 months or pregnant or lactating women needing any nutrition support by a health professional, including technical (MCF and CMAM) services, receive nutrition support within 48 hours	Planned	0%	50%	50%	50%	Health facilities have nutritional rehabilitation supplies available	25499 children 6-59 months (G-13714, B-12657) and 13263 PLW were reached through monthly identification, screening and referral of acutely malnourished cases in 161 communities and in Inhambane province. 49 referred cases received nutrition services within 48 hours	Nothing to report			
		Achieved		0	50%	100%						
		Source	Nutrition volunteer MBE forms, supervision forms									
	Output Indicator 4.2	% of communities where all active nutrition volunteers submit complete monthly MUAC data for all their target households	Planned	0%	50%	50%		50%	Nutrition volunteers have submitted their reports on the 6th of each month, in all 316 communities, with the forms on nutritional surveillance done at community level. In Inhambane, the major floods that affected the district of Govuro in January 2017 and the March 2017 cyclone Dineo significantly delayed the nutrition activities implementation. At the end of February 2016 COSACA managed to organize a first three-days training of trainers' on identification, referral and follow-up of Malnourished	Nothing to report		
			Achieved		0	50%		54%				
			Source	Nutrition volunteer MBE forms, supervision forms								
	Output Indicator 4.3	% of children 6-59 months who are prescribed treatment for MAM or SAM receive at least 1 home visit by a nutrition volunteer within 1 week of starting treatment	Planned	0%	50%	50%		50%	206 children 6-59 months (G-110, B-98) were screened and in Inhambane province, 49 children 6-59 months were referred for nutrition therapeutic services. Reports on defaulting cases encountered during the previous quarter evidenced the active implementation of a follow-up system through home visits. These were done by the Musungulude or by MoH Community Health workers (APES). Thus, all the 49 children 6-59 months on treatment for MAM and SAM children received at least one (w) children with severe or severe were referred to the nearest health facility for nutrition services.	Nothing to report		
			Achieved		50%	50%		100%				
			Source	Nutrition volunteer MBE forms, supervision forms								
	IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Output Indicator 4.4		Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)		Target (Mar 2017)				
	1%	% of children 6-59 months and pregnant or lactating women who are classified as acutely malnourished by MUAC are referred and counseled by a nutrition volunteer	Planned	0%	50%	50%		50%	In Manica province, 97 pregnant and/or lactating women were reached with Maternal Infant and Young Child Feeding (MIYCF) behaviour change sessions at the Food fairs and within their communities during the home visits by community volunteers. (These included text mobilisation sessions at	Nothing to report		
	Achieved			100%	100%	100%						
Source	Nutrition volunteer MBE forms, supervision forms											
INPUTS (USD)	DFID (USD)		SIDA (USD)	Other (USD)	Total (USD)	DFID SHARE (%)						
	154,175		0		154,175	100%						
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)											
OUTPUT 5	Output Indicator 5.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update	Follow Up Action			
District health services have increased capacity to plan for emergency nutrition responses	% of district health authorities who hold monthly district planning meetings and review community and health facility nutrition data for decision-making	Planned	0%	50%	50%	50%	Government health systems have the capacity to respond. Seasonal migration of communities due to external factors like conflict	Regional coordination supported coordination with DRS Nutrition technical focal person from the districts to assess the health facility needs (equipment and supplies) and to improve the referral and follow-up of malnourished children were	Nothing to report			
		Achieved			50%	100%						
		Source	Meeting minutes, health facility and community nutrition data									
	Output Indicator 5.2	% of districts with detailed monthly mobile brigade schedules (who, when, how)	Planned	0%	50%	50%		50%	COSACA supported the logistic of the Brigades mobiles for 3 months from the 12th of December till the 12th of March by allocating 5 cars with drivers for the 4 districts namely Fomalou, Panda, Macodé and Govuro. Fuel expenses during this period were covered.	Nothing to report		
			Achieved		0	50%		100%				
			Source	Mobile brigade schedules								
	IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Planned	0%	50%	50%	50%		10 is the target for the milestone 3, and since milestone 1 do not have any progress and for the mile 4 for a total of 10 campaigns planned for milestone 3, 12 child protection campaigns were made. In this process 130 child recreation spaces in equal number of communities were established and 161 community based child protection committees were formed on child side	nothing to report			
		Achieved		0	0	12						
		Source	Training reports, MBE forms									
	0.16%	Planned	0%	50%	50%	70%		The milestone was not achieved, because the trainees will only be able to show their knowledge regarding child protection through an evaluation after the training. However, 268 people were trained in child protection component, where 126 are men and 133 are women. People who were trained will still be interviewed in progress.	A small survey will be done in June to measure the child protection knowledge of the people trained			
		Achieved		0	0	0						
		Source	Pre & Post Training Surveys									
INPUTS (USD)	DFID (USD)		SIDA (USD)	Other (USD)	Total (USD)	DFID SHARE (%)						
	28,751		0		28,751	100%						
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)											
OUTPUT 6	Output Indicator 6.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (Sep 2016)	Milestone 2 (Dec 2016)	Target (Mar 2017)	Assumptions	Progress Update	Follow Up Action			
Increased awareness and participation of field staff and community on key child protection issues	# of child protection awareness raising campaigns conducted	Planned	0	2	6	10	Community Based Child Protection Mechanisms are willing and able to engage in child protection awareness raising campaigns	10 is the target for the milestone 3, and since milestone 1 do not have any progress and for the mile 4 for a total of 10 campaigns planned for milestone 3, 12 child protection campaigns were made. In this process 130 child recreation spaces in equal number of communities were established and 161 community based child protection committees were formed on child side	nothing to report			
		Achieved		0	0	12						
		Source	Training reports, MBE forms									
	IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	Planned	0%	50%	50%	70%		The milestone was not achieved, because the trainees will only be able to show their knowledge regarding child protection through an evaluation after the training. However, 268 people were trained in child protection component, where 126 are men and 133 are women. People who were trained will still be interviewed in progress.	A small survey will be done in June to measure the child protection knowledge of the people trained			
		Achieved		0	0	0						
		Source	Pre & Post Training Surveys									
	INPUTS (USD)	DFID (USD)		SIDA (USD)	Other (USD)	Total (USD)				DFID SHARE (%)		
		28,751		0		28,751				100%		
	INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)										

Annex II: List of Materials Used for Desk Research

The following were provided to us by COSACA partners for use in desk research:

COSACA Emergency Response Baseline
COSACA Mozambique Market Analysis Assessment
COSACA Response IPTT _ GAZA March
COSACA Response IPTT CARE March
COSACA_Post Distribution Monitoring FOOD PDM - January distribution CARE REVISED
COSACA_Technical_Narrative_OFDA_2016_Issues_Letter
Gaza and Inhambane CTP Feasibility and Risk Assessment Report
HEA Report final, 8 Mar16
Mozambique Drought Response Plan HCT April2016
Narrative Concern DFID 2 SIDA Q3 Report
Narrative COSACA DFID 2 SIDA Q2
Notes of DFID visit to COSACA in Gaza 12-14 Oct 2016
Notes WV DFID meetings Feb 6 2017
OFDA 2 Quarterly Report
Oxfam Rapid Market Assessment in Sofala 15 Dec 2016
PDM Seeds Mopeia_February_Concern_Mopeia
ECHO Oxfam eSingle Form 2014
Post Distribution Monitoring Report MARCH GAZA
CONCERN Market Assessment Manica and Zambezia
COSACA 2013-16 Final Evaluation Report
COSACA_Market Monitoring Report Machaze
COSACA_PDM Sementes-Gaza
FOOD PDM REPORT_Mopeia_January 17
FOOD PDM REPORT_Mopeia_March17
KAP report - Pre (Sofala, inhambane)
Relatorio de PM_COSACA Gaza Dez 16
Relatorio_AVASAN_Jul2016_05Set2016v3
Relatorio_Final_Monitoria_de_Sguranca_Alimentar_e_Nutricional_Novembro_2016
Final Report for MasterCard Implementation and LMMS
The COSACA Consortium. Power point presentation, Maputo 22 November 2016
Final COSACA Proposal to DFID: El Nino Drought Response in Mozambique Promoting recovery and building resilience of drought affected people in Mozambique, July 2016

Annex III: Evaluation Questions (Full List)

Appropriateness: The extent to which the COSACA II intervention was tailored to local needs, increased ownership, accountability and cost effectiveness.

1. Was an assessment undertaken prior to project implementation to fully understand the needs of the specific populations? Did this assessment look at all sectors of the population – men and women, children, the elderly, the disabled, displaced populations, etc.?
2. Were any segments of the local population excluded? Were the needs of vulnerable or marginalized populations, such as the elderly and disabled, taken in to account?
3. Did the program reach the intended audience?
4. Is the program sustainable?
5. Is there any perceived change for the target population?

Effectiveness: the extent to which the COSACA II intervention achieved its purpose.

1. What activities were completed in the evaluation areas? What was the initial target for these areas and did the intervention meet its target (in terms of range of activities and beneficiaries reached)?
2. What activities were overlooked (not implemented)?
3. What did the project do well? What were the main factors that influenced the achievement of the objectives?
4. What were the main challenges in terms of getting the benefits to the target population?
5. What perceived difference has the project made to the beneficiaries? What factors influenced the achievements? To what extent did different factors influence the achievements observed? Did observe any unintended effects?
6. To what extent do the changes/effects of the project satisfy (or not) the community's needs? How much does the degree of satisfaction differ according to the different beneficiaries (different areas and program activities)?
7. Have goods and services been delivered to the most vulnerable groups (men, women, boys and girls, displaced populations)?

Efficiency: The outputs – both qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs.

1. Have the objectives been achieved within the deadlines set? Was there a gap in programming between intended roll-out and actual commencement of programming? Why? How could this have been avoided? How could available resources (human, financial, material) been leveraged to avoid the delay?
2. Could more have been done with the available resources offered by the combined strengths of the Consortium?
3. Were the aid delivery modalities efficient? How could they be improved? In looking at various food assistance mechanisms, which have been the most effective?
4. Was funding made available in a timely manner? How much flexibility was there in the use of the funding?
5. In comparison to similar programs in the country/region, have the COSACA II interventions been implemented more or less efficiently compared to alternative forms of programming?

Coverage: The extent to which the most vulnerable were reached by COSACA II intervention

1. Who was reached through this programming? How were beneficiaries selected? What percentage of the community had access? What specific actions were taken to ensure that all targeted vulnerable persons were reached?
2. Was the humanitarian assistance provided in the right areas? What areas were excluded and why? What could have been done to improve the geographical prioritization?
3. If programming directly targeted most vulnerable groups, how were these specific groups identified? To what extent did the local authorities assist with targeting the most vulnerable?

In addition, given the need to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of program partners and their role as partners in a Consortium, we included questions that specifically sought to gain insight into coordination between Consortium members to determine the advantages and disadvantages to designing response interventions in this manner and to highlight lessons to be learned to guide future project planning. Evaluation questions for these criteria included the following:

Coordination internally: The extent to which the actions by the individual COSACA members were harmonised with each other, promoted synergy, avoided gaps, duplication and resource conflicts; and the role and functioning of the COSACA CMU to ensure coordination within the consortium.

1. How has COSACA evolved? What are the positive aspects of this evolution? The negative ones?
2. What was the added value to the consortium structure? What were the incentives for coordination?
3. To what extent did the various partners/sectors work together to achieve the objectives?
4. To what extent were interventions organized to maximise their joint effects?
5. What were the challenges of working in a Consortium? Is there anything else that may have worked better? What can be changed with regards to the nature of this relationship in the future? How could better coordination have been achieved?
6. Did the CMU add value to the functioning of COSACA as a consortium?
7. Did the CMU prevent overlap and duplication?
8. What were the gaps in the functioning of the CMU?
9. Were all partner roles in the project clearly delineated? Were there was duplication of roles, inaction on the part of some partners, or turf issues?

Coordination externally: The extent to which the COSACA II intervention and interventions of different actors (government and national, provincial, district level; other humanitarian agencies) were harmonised with each other, promoted synergy, avoided gaps, duplication and resource conflicts, and examine the role and functioning of the COSACA CMU in external coordination.

1. What was the added value to the consortium structure? What were the incentives for coordination? How could better coordination have been achieved?
2. To what extent did the various partners work together to achieve the objectives?
3. To what extent were interventions of various organisations working in the same sector organized to maximise their joint effects?
4. What supported coordination? What detracted from it? How could better coordination be achieved in the future?
5. Were there was duplication of roles, inaction on the part of some partners, or turf issues?
6. What could have been done to avoid these gaps or duplication?

Finally, as this served as the final evaluation of COSACA II programming, we included analysis of the project's value for money. To do this, we used the "3E's" approach to assessing the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of the program and the connection between cost and performance. Using

this methodology, we attempted to develop evidence-based analysis of the value of both the overall program and individual activities. Evaluation questions for this criteria include the following:

Value for Money:

Did the COSACA II intervention provide value for money in terms of:

1. Procurement and financial management processes. Were resources shared, when possible, amongst Consortium partners?
2. Being able to procure high quality inputs and support processes and procedures within the expected budget. What items or activities generated the highest costs? Why? How can this be limited in the future? How do these costs compare to similar projects implemented in the region?
3. Were the interventions informed by assessments and continuous monitoring and evaluation?
4. Was there effective surveying and community involvement? How much input did the local community have in guiding project activity?

Annex IV: Focus Group and KII Composition

Location	Type	Composition
Mabalane	4 FGDs	Female – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	4 FGDs	Male – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	8 KIIs	4 community leaders, 2 COSACA volunteers, 2 teachers , 1 Agriculture expert, 1 COSACA rep
Quelimane (Zambezia)	1 KII	Vendor
Lua Lua (Zambezia)	1 FGD	Female – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	3 KIIs	District Administrator, community leader, agricultural specialist
Maputo	3 Logistical meetings	Implementing partners
	7 KIIs	3 Save staff members, Concern CD, Oxfam Humanitarian Manager, 2 Care CD and Emergency Coordinator
Funhalouro (Tsenane)	1 FGD	Female – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	1 FGD	Male – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
Funhalouro (Sede)	1 FGD	Female – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	1 FGD	Male – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	7 KIIs	3 Care staff, community leader, CCM staff, INGC, Ministry of Agriculture
Funhalouro (Tome)	1 FGD	Male – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	2 KIIs	Community leaders
Mopeia	2 FGD	Female – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	1 FGD	Male – seed/tool/e-voucher recipients
	1 FGD	Children aged 13-17, including child

		heads of households
	7 KIIs	Permanent Secretary, two vendors, INGC staff member, 2 Concern staff members, 1 local leader

Annex V: Focus Group Discussion Guide

READ: Good morning / afternoon, my name is XXX, and I am working with two research companies, IHSI and KGF Pesquisa e Associados.

Thank you for agreeing to take part in the study. We are conducting this focus group to assess the effect of the COSACA programme on emergency food assistance in this area. Through this research, we will speak with people like you as well as the NGOs and key decision makers about a number of factors that affect the implementation of the programme.

The information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence and will only be used to help us write our report. We will not publish your name in the report or include any personal information about you. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions. May I proceed?

To begin with, can I ask each of you to state your name and tell me a little bit about yourself – how many people live with you in your household, how many of them are children under aged 5, etc.?

Section 1: General situation

How is life for you in this community these days? What are some of the struggles you face? What are some of the positive aspects to life here?

Of all the things in your life, what do you worry most about?

How does your household make a living?

a) *Prompt: Sources of cash income? Farming or gathering food from farms?*

Do most families in this community participate in the same activities or are there differences?

Has how your household supports itself changed over the past year, for instance, do you have any new sources of income or new jobs? Why did these changes occur?

Are there certain times of the year when your household has a harder time supporting itself?

b) *Prompt: probe for specific information concerning the drought and how their region/community was affected*

Communities are usually made up of families from different backgrounds and in different circumstances. Sometimes some groups have more wealth, land, property or access to services than others. Which groups in your community have the most difficulty gathering wealth, property, land or getting access to services?

a) *Why do you think this is?*

Are there members of your community who have a more difficult time making a living than others?

a) *PROBE the elderly, disabled, child heads of households, etc.*

b) *What makes things more difficult for them?*

c) *How do these individuals and families survive?*

Section 2: Vouchers [if applicable]

Some organizations distribute vouchers for goods such as maize, rice, or oil, in order for people who

don't have much money to purchase these items. Have you heard about this?

Have you participated in this activity?

How did you receive these vouchers?

- a) NOTE – keep this vague so that we can learn about how programs were actually implemented.
- b) Prompt: Probe for information about paper vs. e-vouchers, asking which they have received, when they received each type, and what the benefits were for each type

Where do you use these vouchers and what products are available?

Can you easily access the goods you want to buy? Why or why not?

Are there any products that you need that are not available?

When did the program start? What was the community like before this happened? How were things for your households before the program started?

What are things like for you and your community now, after the program?

What did you like about the program? How has it changed things for you?

What did you not like? What do you still struggle with?

Have you heard about individuals, households, or other communities that did not receive these vouchers? Why do you think they did not receive them? Is life harder for them because they did not receive any?

- c) PROBE the elderly, disabled, child heads of households

Is this program something you would want to participate in again?

If so, why? If not, why?

How can this program be made better for you, your family, and your community?

Have there been any other programs like this in your area – programs to provide food assistance specifically?

Is there any other program – either one you have seen in the past or one you have heard about in other communities – that you would like to see in your area instead?

- a) Probe: Do people prefer to continue using informal financial systems that are more familiar, accessible and profitable? Paper vouchers or in-kind aid? What would be the preferable way of aid for the beneficiaries: in-kind? Paper vouchers, e-vouchers?
- b) What are advantage of e-vouchers compare to other methods?
- c) Difference in consumption with and without Master Card? Was mastercard easier to use? Did it motivate people to buy more than paper vouchers?
- d) Is it suitable for urgent needs?
- e) Was the training about how to use the e-vouchers easy to understand? Did you face any

problems with their use, for example, forgetting PIN CODES? How were these problems solved?

Section 3: Seed/tool distribution [if applicable]

Some organizations distribute seeds and tools to help farmers who have lost their harvests. Have you participated in this activity?

What did you receive? Seeds? Tools? Both?

How did you receive these items?

a) NOTE – keep this vague so that we can learn about how programs were actually implemented

When did the program start? What was the community like before this happened? How were things for your households before the program started?

What are things like for you and your community now, after the program?

What did you like about the program? How has it changed things for you?

What did you not like? What do you still struggle with?

How many times have you received seed and/or tool assistance?

Have you heard about individuals, households, or other communities that did not receive these seeds/vouchers? Why do you think they did not receive them? Is life harder for them because they did not receive any?

b) PROBE the elderly, disabled, child heads of households

Is this program something you would want to participate in again?

If so, why? If not, why?

How can this program be made better for you, your family, and your community?

Have there been any other programs like this in your area – programs to provide food assistance specifically?

Is there any other program – either one you have seen in the past or one you have heard about in other communities – that you would like to see in your area instead?

Nutrition [if applicable]

Is your community served by health workers that provide community screening and referrals?

What diseases do they screen for? What diseases do they provide referrals for?

Have you personally met these health care workers? Have they diagnosed or treated children in your family? What was the experience like? What did you like? What did you not like?

Have you been invited to participate in any community forums that focus on health issues?

If yes, what was the topic of the forum? What issues were discussed? Were any problems identified

and solutions discussed? What other groups were represented there?

Did you find these forums useful? What in particular was useful about them? How could they be improved in the future? What specific, health related topics would you like to see included in future community forums?

How was the invitation done? Do you think the right people were invited at the forum? If no, who would you like to see represented at these forums?

WASH [if applicable]

How do you access water in your community? Is this how you have always access water or has there been a change in the past year? Why was there a change? What change has been made?

Are there people in this community who struggle to access this water point? Why?

Has anyone been working in your community to distribute water? What about to fix old wells or other water points?

Have you met with people who have taught you about hygiene and sanitation? For example, how to clean your hands well? Who are these people and what did they teach you?

Where did you meet them? Did they come to your house or did they hold a community meeting?

Has there been a change in awareness about hygiene and sanitation in the past year? Why? What has the change been?

Are all members of your community invited to participate in these learning activities? What about the elderly, disabled, and children?

To what extent has this knowledge about good hygiene and sanitation translated into actual practices? / To what extent are people practicing good hygiene and sanitation?

Are there any groups of people which are particularly resistant to changing practices around hygiene and sanitation? Where does this resistance come from?

Conclusion [ALL]

Have you ever heard about the COSACA program? Have you heard about work being done by Save the Children/CARE/Concern/Oxfam (select appropriate for area)?

What do you think about the work that is being done?

Has anyone ever heard about community consultation to evaluate your needs and to collect feedback about the program in general?

- a) If yes, when you have complaints, who do you direct your feedback to?
- b) Generally, how are the complaints addressed? [Prompt: inquire how well the complaints are addressed]

How has this project contributed to:
[FOOD SECURITY] food security?

[SEED/TOOL] improved harvests?

[NUTRITION]Reducing in the children dying out of hunger and malnutritions in your community/Reduction in frequency of your children falling sick

[WASH] improved access to water and hygiene?

Why do you feel this way?

In your opinion, have these programs responded to the needs and interests of diverse groups in this town/ village? In what ways? What more needs to be done?

If you could tell anything to the people who the programs we have talked about today, what feedback would you give them?

Thank you for your time.

Annex VI: Key Informant Interview Guide for COSACA Officials and NGOs

KII Type			
Location			
Date of interview			
Start time:		End time:	
Respondent name (if several participants, list their names)			
Organisation name			
Contact number			

READ: Good morning / afternoon, my name is XXX, and I am working with two research companies, IHSI and KGF Pesquisa e Associados.

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The information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence and will only be used to help us write our report. We will not publish your name in the report or include any personal information about you. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions. May I proceed?

Section 1: General situation

How is life for this community [or: in the COSACA program areas] these days? What are some of the struggles people face? What are some of the positive aspects to life there?

Are there members in this community who have a more difficult time than others?

- a) PROBE the elderly, disabled, child heads of households, etc.
- b) What makes things more difficult for them?
- c) How do these individuals and families survive?

Relevance:

Can you tell me how and why you got involved with the project? Have you worked on similar projects before?

Was there a sufficient need for this kind of services? How relevant has the intervention been to communities in Mozambique?

To what extent have the problems/needs of the communities changed compared to the time when the

programme was designed?
To what extent is the intervention still relevant?

Coverage:

Who was reached through this programming?

How were beneficiaries selected?

What percentage of the community had access? What specific actions were taken to ensure that all targeted vulnerable persons were reached? (PROBE: the elderly, disabled, child headed households)

Was the humanitarian assistance provided in the right areas? What areas were excluded and why? What could have been done to improve the geographical prioritization?

If programming directly targeted most vulnerable groups, how were these specific groups identified? To what extent did the local authorities assist with targeting the most vulnerable?

Impact:

Please describe some of the changes that you noticed as a result of program activities. What was the situation like before the intervention? Afterwards?

What do you think the project did well?

What were the main challenges in terms of getting the benefits to the target population?

What real difference has the project made to the beneficiaries?

What would the situation have been like without the intervention?

What was the main thing, in your view, that the project offered to these communities? Any negative outcomes?

What, if anything, do you think was missing from what project was offering/or you think the project should do more of?

Efficiency:

Did you feel like everybody's roles in the project were clearly delineated? Was there any time that you felt there was duplication of roles, inaction on the part of some partners, or turf issues? Please give examples.

Who did you regularly communicate with? How responsive were those people?

What worked well in terms of communication and getting things done? What was the main challenge in terms of partner relationships?

To what extent did the various partners/sectors work together to achieve the objectives?

To what extent were interventions organized to maximise their joint effects?

Are there any alternatives for achieving the same results with less inputs?

What would you do differently is given a chance? Please also think in terms of the project coverage,

coordination, and its coherence.

Effectiveness:

Do you feel you achieved what you set out to achieve? Do you feel the project achieved its goals?

To what extent were the originally defined objectives of the project realistic?

Could more have been done with the available resources offered by the combined strengths of the Consortium?

Were the aid delivery modalities efficient? How could they be improved? In looking at various payment mechanisms, which have been the most effective?

Was funding made available in a timely manner? How much flexibility was there in the use of the funding?

To what extent can these changes/effects be credited to the intervention?

What factors influenced the achievements observed?

To what extent did other (external) factors influence the achievements observed?

Did you observe any unintended effects?

What would you say is your main accomplishment in the program?

Where do you feel the program fell short?

Did you receive feedback as a result of monitoring and evaluating activities? Was it helpful? Were you able to implement it? Why or why not? Give specific examples.

Did you give feedback over the course of the program? Who did you give feedback to? Was it well-taken and implemented?

Sustainability:

What, if any, aspects of the project will it be possible to continue once programming ends?

What are the obstacles to continuing the programming to this target population?

Coordination and Cost:

How has COSACA evolved? What are the positive aspects of this evolution? The negative ones?

Were the interventions informed by assessments and continuous monitoring and evaluation?

Was there effective surveying and community involvement? How much input did the local community have in guiding project activity?

What items or activities generated the highest costs? Why? How can this be limited in the future? How do these costs compare to similar projects implemented in the region?

What was the added value to the consortium structure? What were the incentives for coordination?

What were the challenges of working in a Consortium? Is there anything else that may have worked better? What can be changed with regards to the nature of this relationship in the future? How could better coordination have been achieved?

Did the CMU add value to the functioning of COSACA as a consortium?

Did the CMU prevent overlap and duplication?

What were the gaps in the functioning of the CMU?

Lessons Learned and Recommendations:

At this stage, what lessons, if any, have you learned about the implementation of COSACA?

Did you have a chance to give feedback about the project? How did it work? Can you give me an example of feedback you provided and what, if anything, happened as a result of this feedback?

What recommendations would you make for improving future COSACA programming throughout Mozambique?

Annex VII: Key Informant Interview Guide for Government Officials

KII Type			
Location			
Date of interview			
Start time:		End time:	
Respondent name (if several participants, list their names)			
Organisation name			
Contact number			

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Section 1: General situation

How is life for this community [or: in the COSACA program areas] these days? What are some of the struggles people face? What are some of the positive aspects to life there?

Are there members in this community who have a more difficult time than others?

- a) PROBE the elderly, disabled, child heads of households, etc.
- b) What makes things more difficult for them?
- c) How do these individuals and families survive?

Relevance:

Was there a sufficient need for this kind of services? How relevant has the intervention been to communities in Mozambique?

To what extent have the problems/needs of the communities changed compared to the time when the programme was designed?

To what extent is the intervention still relevant?

Coverage:

Who was reached through this programming?

How were beneficiaries selected?

What percentage of the community had access? What specific actions were taken to ensure that all targeted vulnerable persons were reached? (PROBE: the elderly, disabled, child headed households)

Was the humanitarian assistance provided in the right areas? What areas were excluded and why? What could have been done to improve the geographical prioritization?

If programming directly targeted most vulnerable groups, how were these specific groups identified? To what extent did the local authorities assist with targeting the most vulnerable?

Impact:

Please describe some of the changes that you noticed as a result of program activities. What was the situation like before the intervention? Afterwards?

What do you think the project did well?

What were the main challenges in terms of getting the benefits to the target population?

What real difference has the project made to the beneficiaries?

To what extent do the changes/effects of the project satisfy (or not) the communities' specific needs? How much does the degree of satisfaction differ according to the different beneficiaries?

What would the situation have been like without the intervention?

What was the main thing, in your view, that the project offered to these communities? Any negative outcomes?

What, if anything, do you think was missing from what project was offering/or you think the project should do more of?

Efficiency:

Did you regularly communicate with those implementing the program? How responsive were those people?

What worked well in terms of communication and getting things done? What was the main challenge in terms of partner relationships?

To what extent did the various partners/sectors work together to achieve the objectives?

What would you do differently is given a chance? Please also think in terms of the project coverage, coordination, and its coherence.

Effectiveness:

To what extent were the originally defined objectives of the project realistic?

To what extent was the target group reached?

What have been the effects of the intervention?

Could more have been done with the available resources offered by the combined strengths of the Consortium?

Were the aid delivery modalities efficient? How could they be improved? In looking at various payment mechanisms, which have been the most effective?

Was funding made available in a timely manner? How much flexibility was there in the use of the funding?

To what extent can these changes/effects be credited to the intervention?

What factors influenced the achievements observed?

To what extent did different factors influence the achievements observed?

Did you observe any unintended effects?

Do you feel the project achieved its goals?

What would you say is your main accomplishment in the program?

Where do you feel the program fell short?

Did you receive feedback as a result of monitoring and evaluating activities? Was it helpful? Were you able to implement it? Why or why not? Give specific examples.

Did you give feedback over the course of the program? Who did you give feedback to? Was it well-taken and implemented?

Sustainability:

What, if any, aspects of the project will it be possible to continue once programming ends?

Do you anticipate that the number of workers/other resources you have available to you will decrease after the end of the project?

What are the obstacles to continuing the programming to this target population?

Lessons Learned and Recommendations:

At this stage, what lessons, if any, have you learned about the implementation of COSACA?

Did you have a chance to give feedback about the project? How did it work?

Can you give me an example of feedback you provided and what, if anything, happened as a result of this feedback?

What recommendations would you make for improving future COSACA programming throughout Mozambique?